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WHAT DID YOU KNOW AND WHEN DID YOU
KNOW IT?: PUBLIC COMPANY DISCLOSURE
AND THE MYTHICAL DUTIES TO CORRECT
AND UPDATE
Gregory S. Porter*
INTRODUCTION

A

LLEGATIONS of securities fraud generally can be broken down

into two types of cases-those claiming fraud based upon what a
corporation or its insiders have said, and those claiming fraud based
upon what they have not said, but should have. A corporation can
clearly be held liable under the federal securities laws if it makes false
or misleading statements.' Less well-defined are the circumstances
under which a corporation can be held liable for what it has not said.
The express disclosure requirements for publicly traded companies
are a jumble of statutes, rules, forms, and schedules promulgated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission"), and the
interpretive gloss on these express disclosure requirements provided
by the Commission.2 Outside this statutory and administrative rule
framework, the traditional rule of corporate disclosure has long been
* The author is an associate in the Dallas office of Baker & McKenzie and
practices in the areas of securities regulation and mergers and acquisitions. The
author wishes to thank Hazel Landwehr Porter for her insightful criticism of early
drafts of this Article.
1. There are several provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77amm ("Securities Act"), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk
("Exchange Act"), under which a corporation may incur liability as a result of making
a false or misleading statement. See U.S.C. §§ 77. 78 (1999). Chief among them are
section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (liability for false or misleading
statements made in a Securities Act registration statement), section 12 of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (liability for making a false or misleading statement by
a person who offers or sells a security), and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1999), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated by the Commission thereunder,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999) (it is unlawful to make misleading statements or
omissions in connection with the purchase or sale of any security).
2. Examples of the many explicit disclosure obligations include: (1) the detailed
information required to be filed annually on Form 10-K: (2) quarterly information
required to be filed on Form 10-Q; (3) Form 8-K's which are required to be filed
within 10 days following certain material events such as a change of corporate control,
significant acquisitions or dispositions of assets, and changes in a corporation's
auditors; and (4) the detailed information required to be filed in a registration
statement in connection with the sale of a security.
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that corporations have no general duty to disclose information simply
because that information is material.3 Additionally, absent a duty to
disclose, there can be no liability for non-disclosure. Over the last
several decades, plaintiffs and numerous commentators have urged
the creation of a variety of implied disclosure duties to supplement the

express disclosure requirements.5 Two of these implied disclosure
duties, the duty to correct and the duty to update, if accepted and

robustly applied, threaten to swallow the general rule and impose
liability for any failure to disclose material information.6 In fact, one
commentator has suggested that given the "smorgasbord" of statutes,
rules, interpretive gloss, and judicially created disclosure duties, we
are fast approaching a de facto continuous disclosure requirement for
all material information, if we have not reached it already,7 while
another commentator suggests that under current law, virtually any
undisclosed information can be attacked under some plausible duty to
disclose theory.8
This Article argues that fears of a de facto continuous disclosure
requirement through judicial fiat are unfounded. The duties to update
and correct appear to have assumed a mythical status; they are widely
discussed and generally assumed to exist (at least in some form), but
very few people have actually seen them. 9 Many cases discuss the
3. See infra notes 12-33 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 44-177 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 68-113 and accompanying text.
7. See Dale A. Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure
Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations:"Are We There Yet?", 20 Cardozo L.
Rev. 135, 136-38 (1998). Professor Oesterle argues that the complex system of
statutes and administrative rules, combined with inconsistent interpretations of the
statutes and rules by federal courts, threatens to make corporate disclosure so difficult
that securities lawyers will recommend to their clients that continuous disclosure of all
material information is necessary to avoid liability. See id. He also argues that a
system that expressly requires disclosure of all material information with certain
exceptions might be preferable to the current system under which there is no
requirement to disclose material information absent a duty. Identifying the duties,
however, is extremely complex. See id. at 171-91.
He further suggests that
modifications to our current system of enforcing disclosure obligations could
ameliorate the problems inherent in a continuous disclosure system. See id. at 158-65.
Finally, he notes that the various stock exchanges have rules that effectively amount
to a continuous disclosure system (although they are not generally enforced). See id.
at 174-75, 220-25. Whether an express continuous disclosure system might be
preferable to the current disclosure system is beyond the scope of this Article. This
Article does, however, attempt to explain some of the compliance difficulties
presented by a continuous disclosure system given the current enforcement
framework.
8. See Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for
Technology-EnhancedInvesting, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 753, 772 n.60 (1997).
9. See Robert H. Rosenblum, An Issuer's Duty Under Rule lob-5 to Correct and
Update Materially Misleading Statements, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 289, 315 (1991)
(discussing the duties to correct and update, Rosenblum states that "relatively few
courts have purported to impose liability for the breach of either duty, and few of the
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duties, and the federal courts have often stated that they exist.
Rarely, however, have the federal courts given any justification for
them. Further, when actually faced with a plaintiff seeking damages,
the federal courts have frequently found reasons not to impose the
duties. Enough cases and commentators have nonetheless suggested
that the duties exist, despite their narrow application to date, to chill
the disclosure of forward-looking information, and to give justifiable
concern to corporations and their counsel in navigating the maze of
disclosure requirements.
Part I of this Article discusses the general rule that information is
not required to be disclosed simply because it may be material, and
analyzes the insider trading cases that created the first widely
accepted disclosure duty outside the explicit requirements of the
securities laws and the Commission's rules. Part II then examines the
various forms the duties to correct and update have assumed, and
describes how, if the duties were robustly applied, a continuous
disclosure system could ensue. This part also shows the disparate
treatment afforded historical factual statements and "forvard-looking
statements" by the federal courts. Finally, this part argues that
despite the fears generated by a few poorly articulated cases, the
federal courts have rarely imposed liability for failure to comply with
the duty to correct or the duty to update.
Part III examines the justifications for the duties to correct and
update. This Article first concludes that the duty to correct is a
remedy in search of a problem. In all but the narrowest of
circumstances, a remedy exists under current doctrine for the
securities law violation that the duty to correct is purported to cover,
rendering the duty to correct superfluous. With respect to the duty to
update, this Article concludes that the duty to update is not
compatible with section 10(b) of the Exchange Act or Rule lOb-5.
The federal securities laws require statements be judged at the time
they are made; they do not permit reference to subsequent changed
circumstances to determine whether a statement is misleading. In
addition, forward-looking statements by their nature are not capable
of being correct or incorrect. They are only opinions as to the future.
As such, when events fail to materialize as foretold, highlighting the
impossibility of predicting the future, prior statements are not
rendered misleading. Even if a duty to update did exist at one time,
such a duty was largely eliminated by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 ("Reform Act"). 0 Part III also argues that
cases have attempted to provide a detailed explanation of the bases of those duties"
(citation omitted)).
10. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in various sections of 15
U.S.C.) ("Reform Act"). The Reform Act would eliminate the duty to update with
respect only to those forward-looking statements that fall within the safe harbor
provisions of the Reform Act. Not all forward-looking statements meet the Reform
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complying with a broadly interpreted duty to update would be
virtually impossible.
Finally, Part IV offers suggestions for a new approach to analyzing
forward-looking statements. This Article argues that Rule 10b-5
should be read to require that a corporation's statements be viewed in
light of the corporation's prior forward-looking statements.
Corporations should not be required to continually reevaluate all
prior forward-looking statements; changed circumstances should not
When
render prior forward-looking statements fraudulent.
corporations voluntarily choose to speak or are required to speak as a
result of periodic or episodic filing requirements, however, they
should be required to take into account their prior forward-looking
statements. If at the time of such voluntary or required speech,
circumstances have changed from those that existed when an earlier
forward-looking statement was made, additional disclosure regarding
the prior statements may be necessary in order to prevent the current
statements from being misleading. In addition, when a corporation is
required to speak in quarterly and annual filings, Item 303 of
Regulation S-K" may provide an independent basis to require
corporations to update their prior forward-looking statements.
I.

THE GENERAL RULE AND THE FIRST IMPLIED DISCLOSURE

DUTY

One of the primary purposes of the federal securities laws is to
require corporations to disclose information sufficient for investors to
make rational investment decisions."2 Indeed, the federal securities
laws explicitly require disclosure of a broad range of information, both
periodically and based upon the occurrence of certain events' 3 The

Act's definition of forward-looking statements, and not all statements meeting that
definition qualify for the safe harbor provisions. See infra notes 276-89 and
accompanying text.
11. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1999).
12. The preamble to the Securities Act states that the Securities Act is "[an Act
[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and
foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof."
Securities Act of 1933, Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §
77a (1999)); see also Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994)
(stating that the purpose of the Securities Act was to replace caveat emptor with a
system of full disclosure); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988) (same);
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (noting that a
fundamental purpose of the securities laws was "to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
business ethics in the securities industry" (emphasis omitted)).
13. The periodic disclosure requirements include: (1) the annual filing of Form 10K, which requires an extensive discussion of the corporation's business for the
preceding five years; (2) disclosure of audited financial statements for the
immediately preceding three fiscal years, and management's analysis of the changes in
its financial condition and the results of its operations for the periods covered by its
financial statements (known as the "MD&A"); and (3) quarterly filings of Form 10-Q,
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literal language of the federal securities laws, however, clearly does

not require disclosure of all material information. 4 The explicit
provisions do not require disclosure of material developments
occurring between periodic filings with the Commission and not
coinciding with the episodic filing requirements."
During the 1960's and 1970's, numerous commentators argued over
whether the general anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws,
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act16 and Rule 10b-5," could be read to
which require quarterly and year-to-date financial statements and an MD&A
covering the quarter and year-to-date period. Episodic disclosure requirements
include: (1) filing of a proxy statement preceding any meeting of the corporation's
stockholders, which requires detailed information about the items to be voted on at
the stockholder's meeting; (2) registration statements that are required to be filed
prior to the sale of the corporation's securities, which requires an extensive disclosure
regarding the contemplated offering; and (3) the filing of Form 8-K, which is required
to be filed within 10 days following certain material events such as a change of control
of the corporation, significant acquisitions or dispositions of assets, and changes in a
corporation's auditors.
14. See Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing is Coning to
an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 675, 678-79 (1999).
The author states:
While the securities laws require the disclosure of a large quantity of
information in the public offering context and otherwise, they do not create
any standing rule or impose upon companies any general duty to disclose to
the public all material information whenever such information becomes
available to the company.
See id.; Herbert S. Wander, Developments in Securities Law Disclosure, at 209
(PLI/Corp. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1065, Aug. 1998).
15. While the federal securities laws do not have a requirement to disclose all
material information, each of the major stock exchanges do have such a requirement.
See New York Stock Exchange Company Manual § 202.05 (1996); American Stock
Exchange Guide § 401(a) (1992). The American Stock Exchange does provide an
exception for "facts that are in a stock of flux" and information that would -prejudice
the ability of the company to pursue corporate objectives." American Stock Exchange
Guide § 402(a). Each of the exchanges has severe penalties for failure to comply with
their rules, including delisting from the exchange, but such rules are rarely enforced.
Moreover, the federal courts have held that there is no private right of action for
violation of exchange rules. See, eg., Walck v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., 687
F.2d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding no private right of action exists for violation of
exchange rules), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942.
16. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful:
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997).
17. Rule 10b-5 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
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require prompt disclosure of all material information, thus filling in
the gaps left by the explicit provisions of the securities laws." Those
in favor of reading a requirement to promptly disclose all material
information into the anti-fraud provisions made five primary
arguments: (1) an implied representation existed that issuers of
securities would deal fairly with the public; (2) fair dealing
encompassed complete disclosure; (3) investor confidence in the
securities markets required full disclosure; (4) full disclosure was
necessary to effectively deal with insider trading; and (5) public policy
deemed the federal securities laws' explicit disclosure requirements
insufficient. 9
2 0 rejected all
The Supreme Court, in Chiarella v. United States,
arguments that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act or Rule 10b-5
requires disclosure of all material information."' The Court stated:
"When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can
be no fraud absent a duty to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose
under § 10(b) does not
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic
22
market information.
The Chiarella Court defined what has since become the general
rule: corporations do not have a continuous duty to disclose all
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999).
18. See generally Jeffrey D. Bauman, Rule lOb-5 and the Corporation'sAffirmative
Duty to Disclose, 67 Geo. L.J. 935 (1979) (arguing that there ought to be a duty to
disclose all material information); Dennis J. Block et al., Affirmative Duty to Disclose
Material Information Concerning Issuer's FinancialCondition and Business Plans, 40
Bus. Law. 1243 (1985) (discussing the sources of the duty to disclose); Milton H.
Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1340 (1966) (arguing that
there is no duty); Donald M. Feurestein, The Corporation'sObligations of Disclosure
Under the Federal Securities Laws When It is Not Trading in Its Stock, 15 N.Y. L.F,
385 (1969) (same); Ted J. Fiflis, Soft Information: The SEC's Former Exogenous
Zone, 26 UCLA L. Rev. 95 (1978) (arguing that it is unclear whether there is a duty);
Arthur Fleischer, Jr., "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 Harv. L. Rev.
1146 (1965) (arguing that there is no duty); Joseph H. Flom & Peter Atkins, The
Expanding Scope of SEC Disclosure Laws, 52 Harv. Bus. Rev. 109, 112 (1974)
(arguing that there is a duty); Daniel L. Goelzer, Disclosure of PreliminaryMerger
Negotiations-Truth or Consequences?, 46 Md. L. Rev. 974 (1987) (discussing the
duty to disclose in merger negotiations); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The Relationship
Between CorporateDisclosure and Corporate Responsibility, 40 Fordham L. Rev. 565
(1972) (arguing that it is unclear whether there is a duty); Alan L. Talesnick,
Corporate Silence and Rule lOb-5: Does a Publicly Held Corporation Have an
Affirmative Obligation to Disclose?, 49 Deny. L.J. 369 (1972) (arguing that there
ought to be a duty).
19. See generally John M. Sheffey, Securities Law Responsibilities of Issuers to
Respond to Rumors and Other Publicity: Reexamination of a Continuing Problem, 57
Notre Dame L. Rev. 755, 763-67 (1982) (expounding on these arguments made to
support a prompt disclosure requirement).
20. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
21. See id. at 233-34.
22. Id. at 235.
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material information simply because the information may be
material. 2 The Court, however, also recognized the first disclosure
duty not found in the explicit provisions of the federal securities
laws-the duty of an insider to 4disclose all known material
information or to abstain from trading.
Chiarellaaddressed the circumstances under which a person could
be found guilty of securities fraud based upon trading while in
possession of material information which is not generally available to
the investing public (otherwise known as insider trading). The lower
federal courts and the Commission had previously addressed the
issue. In Cady, Roberts & Co., -' the Commission determined that a
corporate insider must abstain from trading in the shares of his
corporation unless he has first disclosed all material information
known to him. 26 In 1968, the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.,27 recognized this disclosure duty.' The Supreme Court
in Chiarellathen put its imprimatur on the "disclose or abstain" duty.
The Court, summarizing the position of the Commission, stated that
the duty of insiders to either abstain or disclose arose from "(i) the
existence of a relationship affording access to inside information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the
unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that
information by trading wvithout disclosure."' The Court's reasoning
in cases involving insider trading has been described as circular: "an
affirmative duty to disclose exists when there is a relationship giving
rise to an affirmative duty to disclose, and that a breach of such a duty
23. See generally Serabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc., 24 F.3d 357, 359 (1st

Cir. 1994) (holding that disclosures of past success do not by themselves impose a
duty on a corporation to inform the market when circumstances change for the
worse); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[A]

corporation is not required to disclose a fact merely because a reasonable investor
would very much like to know that fact."); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22,

24 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting the argument that the fraud on the market theory
imposed a duty to update material information).
24. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.

25. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
26. See id. at 911. The Commission stated that the obligation to disclose or
abstain derives from:
[aln affirmative duty to disclose material information [which] has been

traditionally

imposed on corporate "insiders,"

particularly officers,

directors, or controlling stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently
held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by

virtue of their position by which are not known to person with whom they
deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment.

Id
27. 401 F.2d. 833 (2d Cir. 1968).

28. The court stated that "anyone in possession of material inside information
must either disclose it to the investing public, or, ... must abstain from trading in or

recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains
undisclosed." Id. at 848.
29. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 227.
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is fraudulent if it is fraudulent."3 Nonetheless, the disclosure duty
recognized in Chiarella became the first widely accepted implied
disclosure duty.
The Chiarella Court, approaching the case solely as a question of
non-disclosure, 3 gave little guidance in determining when a "special
relationship" would give rise to an affirmative disclosure duty.3 The
acceptance of an implied disclosure duty and the limited guidance in
determining when such duties arise, has opened the door for the lower
courts to create additional implied disclosure duties. Since Chiarella,
commentators and plaintiffs have argued that the explicit disclosure
requirements should be supplemented with a variety of implied
disclosure duties; the framework in Chiarella lends itself easily to
additional implied duties. Commentators have sought to extend the

"special relationship" found in Chiarella between corporate insiders
and the corporation's stockholders to a fiduciary duty running directly
from the corporation to its stockholders.
If such a fiduciary duty
exists, it would be ever-present, and could be broad enough to support
all types of implied disclosure duties, including a duty to correct and a
duty to update.
II.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

From their first mention, no consensus has existed as to what is

meant by a duty to correct or a duty to update. Commentators and
plaintiffs have used the term "duty to correct" to advocate a variety of

mandatory corrective disclosures, suggesting that a duty to correct
might encompass everything from correcting a corporation's prior
30. Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 293.
31. The Supreme Court could have reached the same conclusion in Chiarella
without resorting to creating a new disclosure duty. The Court could have simply
held under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(a) or (c) that trading in a security by a
corporation or an insider while in possession of material undisclosed information is a
fraudulent scheme or device. The court instead focused on Rule 10(b)-5(b) and the
circumstances in which an omission would be fraudulent. See David M. Brodsky &
Daniel J. Kramer, A Critique of the MisappropriationTheory of Insider Trading, 20
Cardozo L. Rev. 41, 57-58 (1998). As the Court made clear in Chiarella, the
possession of material undisclosed information alone does not trigger a disclosure
duty. See Chiarella, 455 U.S. at 233. The possession of material undisclosed
information should trigger a duty to abstain from trading, making it unnecessary to
discuss whether a disclosure duty existed.
32. Three years after Chiarella,the Court in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
gave some modest amount of additional guidance when it made clear that an
additional factor must be present for an implied disclosure duty to arise, stating that
not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction,
however, come within the ambit of Rule 10b-5." Id. at 654 (citation omitted). The
Court added the further requirement that there must also be manipulation or
deception "where one takes advantage of information intended to be available only
for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone." Id. (citation
omitted).
33. See Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 294.
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inaccurate disclosure, to correcting inaccurate statements made by
securities analysts and the media, and to correcting inaccurate rumors
in the market (both where the corporation was the source of the
inaccurate statements or rumors and situations where the corporation
was not the source). In addition, the federal courts and plaintiffs have
indiscriminately used the terms "duty to update" and "duty to
correct" when discussing whether additional disclosure is required to
update or supplement prior accurate statements when circumstances
change from those that existed at the time the statements were made.
The duties to update and correct have at times been suggested to
apply to historical factual statements, forward-looking statements, and
other types of statements.' The failure to use consistent terminology
has made discussing the duty to correct without discussing the duty to
update, or vice versa, impossible. The lack of consistent language has
also led to great confusion as to the types of statements that might be
subject to a duty to correct or a duty to update, as well as the scope of
these duties.35 Some definitions are in order.
As used in this Article, a "duty to correct" refers to a duty to
provide additional disclosure to correct previous statements if such
statements were inaccurate when they were originally made. This
duty to correct would arise once it is discovered that the prior
disclosure was inaccurate. The duty to correct has also been
suggested to require correcting inaccurate statements made by
securities analysts and the media or responding to inaccurate rumors
in the market.36 To the extent that a corporation was not the source of
an inaccurate statement or rumor, the federal courts have almost
uniformly rejected any duty to "correct" the statements or rumors.'
34. The confusion exists, however, only to the extent that there are other types of
statements other than historical statements and forward-looking statements. This

Article argues that the term "forward-looking statements" covers all statements other
than historical factual statements.
35. For example, courts holding that companies have a duty to correct prior
inaccurate disclosure have cited prior cases that used the term "duty to correct"
improperly. See, eg., In re MobileMedia Sec. Litig., 28 F. Supp. 2d 901, 937 (D.N.J.
1998) (supporting its holding that companies have a duty to correct prior inaccurate
statements, the district court cited Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310 (3d Cir.
1997), which used the term "duty to correct," but applied it to a forward-looking
statement that was not misleading when made but was alleged to have become
misleading due to changed circumstances). For additional discussion of the In re
MobileMedia case, see hifra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
36. See Jeffrey D. Bauman, CorporateDisclosureand Disseinination,in Corporate

News Dissemination, at 63, 89 (PLI/Corp. Practice Course Handbook Series, 1976);
Arnold S. Jacobs, What is a Misleading Statement or Omission Under Rule lOb-5?, 42
Fordharn L. Rev. 243,279-87 (1973); F. Philip Manns, Jr., Comment, Duity to Correct:
A Suggested Framework, 46 Md. L. Rev. 1250, 1260-64 (1987). Sheffey, supra note 19,
at 771-95.
37. See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 176 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating
that accountants are not required to "correct" statements made by their client that
were made attributable to them); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 949, 957 (2d Cir. 1969) (reversing the district court's conclusion
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Where a corporation was the source of an inaccurate statement made
by others or the source of an inaccurate rumor, the federal courts have
treated the statement as one made by the corporation itself, and as
such, any duty to correct inaccurate statements by others or to
respond to rumors is not a separate duty but is more properly
subsumed under a general duty to correct?

The "duty to update," as that term is used in this Article, describes
a duty to provide additional disclosure to supplement or update prior
accurate disclosure when circumstances have changed since the

original statement was made.39 The duty has at various times been

suggested to apply to all statements, to forward-looking statements
only, or to other types of statements. Thus, defining and separating

the concept of "forward-looking statements" from historical factual
statements is also necessary. Historical factual statements include
financial data describing prior fiscal periods and factual statements
describing the current environment in which a corporation operates.
The federal courts and commentators without defining it have often
used the term "forward-looking statement." The term sometimes has
been used as defined by the Commission in Rule 175,40 promulgated
under the Securities Act:
(1) A statement containing a projection of revenues, income (loss),
earnings (loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital
structure or other financial items; (2) [a] statement of management's
plans and objectives for future operations; (3) [a] statement of future
economic performance contained in management's discussion and
analysis of financial condition and results of operations included
pursuant to Item 303 of Regulation S-K...; or (4) [dlisclosed

that a corporation was required to correct an inaccurate newspaper article because
there was no indication that the defendant was responsible for the inaccurate
statements); see also Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 327 n.158 (listing cases that held
that an issuer does not have a duty to correct misleading statements made by third
parties).
38. A long line of cases exist positing that a company can become sufficiently
intertwined with a third party who makes an inaccurate statement that the courts will
deem that the company made the statement itself. See generally Manns, supra note 36,
at 1255-64 (discussing cases where the duty to correct has been found for statements
made by corporate and extracorporate parties); Sheffey, supra note 18, at 779-95
(same).
39. See William B. Gwyn & W. Christopher Matton, The Duty to Update the
Forecasts,Predictions,and Projectionsof Public Companies, 24 Sec. Reg. L.J. 366, 366
(1997); Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 289; Jeffrey A. Brill, Note, The Status of the Duty
to Update, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 605, 620 (1998).
40. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1999). Rule 175 provides that a forward-looking
statement (as defined by the rule) contained in a document filed with the Commission
will not be misleading under Rule 10b-5 if it was made with a reasonable basis and
honestly believed when made. See id. § 230.175(a). For additional discussion of Rule
175 and the Commission's treatment of forward-looking statements, see infra notes
247-64 and accompanying text.
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statements of the assumptions underlying or relating to any of the

statements described in paragraphs [(1), (2), or (3)] of this section."
Forward-looking statements, as defined by Rule 175, essentially
involve management's projections of the corporation's future
economic performance.
More recently, those discussing the term "forward-looking
statement" have referred to the definition in the Reform Act4 2 While
the exact wording is slightly different, the definition in the Reform
Act is virtually identical to the definition in Rule 175. Clearly, though,
the term does not mean the same thing to everyone. For example,
some have suggested that statements of future intent as to corporate
actions are distinct from forward-looking statements," and whether
courts and commentators would include opinions within the definition
of forward-looking statements (which may not specifically speak to
the future, but may state an opinion, the truth of which will be
impossible to determine until a later time) is unclear.'
This Article uses the term "forward-looking statement" in its
broadest sense, intending inclusion of any statement other than one of
historical fact. Examples of the types of statements considered in this
Article to be forward-looking statements include projections,
estimates, statements of intent as to future activities or actions,
opinions, or any other statements that in some way speak to the
future.45
A. Case Law-Duty to Correct
Numerous cases discuss a "duty to correct.9 4 Most, however, do
not mean a duty to correct as the duty is defined in this Article, i.e., a
duty to provide additional disclosure to correct previous statements
once a corporation discovers the statements were inaccurate when
made. The cases discussing a duty to correct instead discuss what this
41. Id. § 230.175(c).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(i)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
43. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
44. Opinions would not likely be forward-looking statements under Rule 175 of
the Reform Act. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
45. Forward-looking information is a subset of soft information that includes
prospective financial information, predictions, projections, and forecasts. See Carl W.
Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. Pa. L Rev. 254,
255 (1972). Schneider describes soft information as anything other than an
objectively verifiable fact. See id. at 254-56.
46. Generally, a duty to correct involves historical factual statements. A couple of
cases, however, have suggested that a duty to correct also applies to a forward-looking
statement if the statement was misleading when made because it did not have a
reasonable basis. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1431
(3d Cir. 1997) ("[Wle think the duty to correct can also apply to a certain narrow set
of forward-looking statements."). The court then describes a situation where a
company makes a forecast of its sales based upon an inaccurate calculation of its past
sales.). See id.; infra notes 196-97, 214 and accompanying text.
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Article defines as a duty to update, i.e., a duty to provide additional
disclosure to supplement or update prior statements when
circumstances change from those in existence when the original
statements were made.47
Of those cases actually referring to the "duty to correct" as a duty

to correct inaccurate prior statements, the existence of the duty
generally is not at issue. Instead, such cases generally involve
plaintiffs claiming violation of a duty to update or a violation of some
other disclosure duty not explicitly found in the federal securities laws

or the Commission's rules. Prior to discussing the existence of the
duty in question, the courts in these cases passingly refer to the
existence of the duty to correct as "an obvious duty. 48 None of the
cases, however, contain any discussion, analysis, or support of the duty
to correct other than a basic statement that it exists.49
After discarding all of the cases that confuse the duty to update
47. See, e.g., Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting
the Third Circuit's interpretation of the duty to correct in In re Phillips Petroleum Sec.
Litig., 881 F.2d Supp. 2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1989)); Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d
738, 744 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[T]here is no duty to correct a prediction falsified by
subsequent events...." (emphasis added)); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 170
n.41 (5th Cir. 1994) ("We note that, at least facially, it appears that defendants have a
duty under Rule 10b-5 to correct statements if those statements have become
materially misleading in light of subsequent events." (emphasis added)); In re Phillips,
881 F.2d at 1245 ("There can be no doubt that a duty exists to correct prior statements,
if the prior statements were true when made but misleading if left unrevised."
(emphasis added)). Compare In re HealthCare Compare Corp. Sec. Litig., 75 F.3d
276, 282 (7th Cir. 1996) (obliterating the distinction between the duty to correct and
the duty to update), with In re International Bus. Machs. Corporate See. Litig., 163
F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that "[ajlthough plaintiffs phrase their claim as a
duty to correct, we believe plaintiffs are alleging a violation of a duty to update"), and
Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining
the difference between the duty to correct and the duty to update where the plaintiff
had alleged a duty to correct but intended to allege a duty to update).
48. See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 177-78 (2d Cir. 1998)
(stating that a duty to correct existed prior to discussing the existence of a duty for
accountants to correct statement made by others); In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114
F.3d at 1431-32 (same); Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1331-32 (stating that a duty to correct
exists prior to discussing the existence of a duty to update); Backman v. Polaroid
Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1990) (same); Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
800 F.2d 1040, 1043-44. (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that a duty to correct exists prior to
discussing the existence of a duty of accountants to disclose fraud by their clients);
United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating in dicta that a duty to
correct existed in a case where the defendant was found guilty of participating in
fraud under section 32(a) of the Exchange Act); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 83
F.R.D. 343, 346 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (stating that a duty to correct exists prior to
discussing the existence of a duty for accountants to update a historical statement).
49. See In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1430-31 (quoting Stransky and
Polaroid);Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1331 ("The [duty to correct] applies when a company
makes a historical statement that, at the time made, the company believed to be true,
but as revealed by subsequently discovered information actually was not. The
company then must correct the prior statement within a reasonable time."); Polaroid,
910 F.2d at 16-17 ("Obviously, if a disclosure is in fact misleading when made, and the
speaker thereafter learns of this, there is a duty to correct it.").
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with the duty to correct and those that state a duty to correct exists
but involve other disclosure duties, only three cases have been found
that impose liability for failure to comply with the duty to correct.
The first case, SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp.,' purports to hold
the defendant guilty of securities fraud for failure to correct historical
statements.51 A close reading of the case, however, shows that the
case is nothing more than a routine insider trading case. The
defendant was found guilty of securities fraud after selling stock in the
corporation of which he was president.5 Prior to the time the
defendant sold the stock, he had made statements to a reporter, later
published, that his company had reached terms for a substantial
acquisition. 53 Although this statement was true when made, the
parties were no longer in agreement as to "vital terms" at the time the
defendant sold the stock due to a subsequent falling out. 1 The
defendant sold the stock without making public the current status of
the acquisition.55 Although the court described the defendant's
actions as violating a duty to correct his previous statements, the
defendant in essence traded in his corporation's stock while in
possession of material undisclosed information.- Instead of a duty to
correct the previous statement, the defendant had the duty not to
trade in his company's stock while he had undisclosed knowledge that
there was now no agreement as to the acquisition, which was material
in light of his previous statement that an agreement had been
reached. 7
The second case, Fischer v. Kletz,-s held that accountants have a
duty to correct statements they made in certifying their client's
financial statements when they later find out that information in the
financial statements is inaccurate. 59 The court found, however, that
the duty to correct existed under common law and not as an implied
disclosure duty under Rule 10b-5. The court specifically reserved
judgement on the plaintiff's claim under Rule 10b-5. ' Unfortunately,
50. 297 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

51. See id
52. See iL at 476.
53. See id-at 475-76.
54. Id at 475.

55. See id
56. See iL at 476.
57. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. has also been cited as the first case to hold that
there is a duty to update prior statements. See Oesterle, supra note 7, at 147 n.52.
While it would be more proper to describe the case as a duty to update case rather

than a duty to correct case, as the statements made by the defendant were correct
when made, there is no reason to create a new disclosure duty in this case, as the
insider trading doctrine covers this situation.
58. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

59. See id at 188.
60. See id at 186.
61. See id at 194.
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Fischer has been frequently incorrectly cited as support for the
proposition that a duty to correct exists under Rule lOb-5. 62
The third case may truly be one of the only cases to impose liability
for failure to comply with the implied duty under Rule 10b-5 to
correct statements that were inaccurate when made. In In re
MobileMedia Securities Litigation,63 MobileMedia made statements
that indicated its operations were in compliance with FCC regulations
in its filings with the Commission relating to a public offering of its
securities.' MobileMedia later discovered and subsequently disclosed
that it had not been in compliance with FCC regulations at the time it
made the statements.65 The court held that sufficient facts in the
record existed to give rise to a duty to correct.' Why the court even
referred to a duty to correct, however, is unclear. Because the
statements were inaccurate when made, and assuming that the
requisite scienter existed, the inaccurate statements violated Rule lOb5, and the court's discussion of a duty to correct was unnecessary. 67
In conclusion, despite the almost universal acceptance of the duty to
correct, there is very little case law to support its existence. Support
for the duty to correct rests primarily on the bald statements in dicta
by numerous federal courts that the duty exists, with no explanation
or justification. The duty to correct has been applied in only a single
case, In re MobileMedia, which provided no explanation as to why it
was necessary to rely on the duty to correct, as the case could have
been decided under Rule 10b-5 without the necessity of resorting to a
duty to correct. Section B details a surprisingly similar lack of support
for a duty to update.
B.

Case Law-The Duty to Update

The first cases to discuss the duty to update suggested an extremely
expansive application of the duty. The duty's expansive application

62. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1043-44 (11th Cir.
1986) (citing Fischer as support for the proposition that Rule lob-5 imposes a duty on
accountants to correct misstatements discovered in previous financial statements);
lIT, an International Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909,927 (2d Cir. 1980) (same).
63. 28 F. Supp. 2d 901 (D.N.J. 1998).
64. See id. at 913-17.
65. See id. at 920-21.
66. See id. at 937.
67. Interestingly, the court cited the statements made by the Third Circuit in
Weiner and In re Burlington Coat Factory as support for the proposition that a duty to
correct existed under Rule lOb-5. See id. Although purporting to hold that a duty to
correct existed, the Third Circuit was referring to a duty to update. See id. The court
stated that "[i]f a statement made by or on behalf of a corporation is later found to be
misleading, the corporation must correct the statement within a reasonable period of
time" and that "[tihere can be no doubt that a duty exists to correct prior statements,
if the prior statements were true when made but misleading if left unrevised." See id.
(quoting Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 1997)).
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was primarily the result of the federal courts' failure to distinguish the
types of statements subject to a duty to update.
The first reported case to suggest that a duty to update might exist
s The district court ultimately granted
was Ross v. A.H. Robins Co.'
the defendant's motion for summary judgement based upon the
plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead fraud with particularity as
required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.?
Having thus disposed of the lawsuit, the district court, for reasons
unknown, addressed the merits of the case. The plaintiffs in A.H.
Robins claimed that Robins's failure to "correct" statements it made
regarding its product, the Dalkon Shield violated section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10(b)(5). 0
Robins made favorable
statements regarding the safety and effectiveness of the Dalkon Shield
and painted a favorable picture of the product's future!' The
plaintiffs argued that as medical evidence became available
questioning the safety and effectiveness of the Dalkon Shield and
numerous class action product liability suits were filed against Robins,
Robins had a duty to provide additional disclosure revealing the
information.72 The court agreed, stating: "It is now clear that there is
a duty to correct or revise a prior statement which was accurate when
made but which has become misleading due to subsequent events.' ' "The court did not discuss whether it believed that Robins's
statements were forward-looking statements or factual statements,
and it is impossible to decipher from the opinion whether such a
distinction would have affected the court's decision. Presumably,
since the court did not address the nature of Robins's statements, the
duty described by the court would apply to statements of any kind.
As the court resolved A.H. Robins based upon failure to properly
plead fraud, the court's statements regarding this duty to "correct,"
i.e., update, are clearly dicta.74 The Second Circuit ultimately agreed
with the district court that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead
fraud, but reversed the district court's dismissal, allowing the plaintiffs
the opportunity to replead.75 The Second Circuit specifically declined
to discuss whether any duty to provide additional disclosure existed.7
68. 465 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
69. See id. at 913.

70. See id at 906.
71. See id

72. See id at 906-07.
73. Id. at 908. The court cites as support A. Jacobs, The Impact of Rule lob-5 §
88.04(b), at 4-14 and the cases cited therein. See id. Although the court used the term

"duty to correct" the court was clearly referring to a duty to update as there is no
indication that the plaintiffs had alleged that the statements were inaccurate when
made. The court then stated that the duty existed as long as the statement remained
"alive" in the market. See id.

74. See id. at 909.
75. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545,559 (2d Cir. 1979).
76. See id. at 559 n.21.
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A three-judge panel decision of the First Circuit in Backman v.
Polaroid Corp." intensified concern that a duty to update might be

broadly applied to all types of statements. Polaroid's 1978 third
quarter report announced record earnings and sales for the quarter
and first nine months of 1978.78 Polaroid featured its new product,
Polavision, on the cover of the report. 79 Expectations for the product

were high, but Polavision proved to be a commercial flop.80 The First
Circuit panel held that, although the plaintiffs did not claim any
statements made by Polaroid were false or misleading, Polaroid was
required to update statements made in the third quarter report once it
became apparent Polavision would not be the success Polaroid had
previously anticipated.8 '
In a rehearing by the First Circuit en banc, 82 the court withdrew the
panel decision and significantly narrowed the scope of the duty to
update. The court determined that Polaroid's statements were solely

statements of historical fact and were precisely correct at the time
they were made. As a result, there was no duty to update the earlier
statements regardless of a subsequent change of circumstances.83
Alas, the First Circuit, much like the district court in A.H. Robins, felt
compelled to make additional statements not necessary to decide the

case. The court stated that:
Obviously, if a disclosure is in fact misleading when made, and the
speaker thereafter learns of this, there is a duty to correct it.... [I]n
special circumstances, a statement, correct at the time, may have a
forward intent and connotation upon which parties may be expected
to rely. If this is a clear meaning, and there is a change,
correction,
84
more exactly, further disclosure, may be called for.

It is unfortunate that the district court in A.H. Robins and the panel
77. Backman v. Polaroid Corp., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 94,899, at 94,937-3 (1st Cir. Jan. 23, 1990).
78. 910 F.2d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc).
79. See id.
80. See id. at 16.
81. The panel decision generated a substantial amount of criticism. See Dennis J.
Block et al., A Post-PolaroidSnapshot of the Duty to Correct Disclosure,1991 Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. 139, 141 (stating that the panel's decision "appeared to mandate
disclosure of all subsequently obtained material facts related to the subject matter of
previously disclosed information-even if the previously disclosed information was
accurate at the time of the original disclosure .... "); Edward Brodsky, The Duty to
Update Information, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 7, 1990, at 3 (describing the panel decision as
"imposing a difficult if not impossible disclosure requirement"); Carl W. Schneider,
Update on the Duty to Update: Did PolaroidProduce the Instant Movie After All, 23
Rev. Sec. & Commodities Reg. 83, 87-90 (1990) (noting the panel decision "took the
updating process to an unworkable extreme").
82. PolaroidCorp., 910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1990).
83. See id. at 16-17.
84. See id. This statement by the First Circuit, despite the fact that it is clearly
dicta, has become the most frequently cited statement in support of a duty to update
forward-looking statements.
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decision in Polaroidused the term "duty to correct" (now recognized
as a duty to update) when discussing the company's disclosure
obligations. The duty the plaintiffs urged the courts to accept was
analytically no different from a duty to disclose all material
information, which was rejected in Chiarella. Public companies are
required on a regular basis to make factual, historical statements on a
wide variety of topics. All material developments represent a change
in circumstances from those that existed when previous historical
statements were made.' Under the analysis used by the district court
in A.H. Robins and the panel in Polaroid,every material development
would allow a plaintiff to point to a "misleading" prior statement. As
an example, assume a company had a good year in 1999, generating
record profits. As required, the company filed a Form 10-K annual
report with the Commission, in which it included audited financial
statements showing the profit for the year and statements that the
company had a "record year" in the MD&A section of its 10-K. Now
assume that the company hits hard times in the first quarter of 2000,
and prior to the time it is required to file its first quarter 10-Q, the
company begins to lose money. The fact that the company is now
losing money is undoubtedly material. It is, however, still true that
the company was profitable in 1999. If an obligation to disclose all
material information existed, the company would have to disclose the
fact that it was losing money in the first quarter of 2000 prior to the
mandated 10-Q filing date. To claim that the company has no duty to
disclose all material information, and then to allow an argument that
the losses in 2000 make an earlier true statement "misleading"
thereby requiring additional disclosure, is nonsensical. A duty to
update historical factual statements is simply a duty to disclose all
material information in disguiseY
85. See Herbert S. Wander et al., Developments in Disclosure.Special Problems in
Public Offerings-Forward-Looking Information, Including the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 San Diego L Rev. 1027, 1059 (1996) ("The 'duty to
update' theory is a misnomer which threatens to negate the established principle that
an independent trigger of a duty to disclose is a distinct element of a Rule lOb-5
action.").
86. See John E. Hayes III, Note, Securities, Lies & Videotape: Backman v.
Polaroid and the Duty to Update, 39 U. Kan. L Rev. 951, 963 (1991) ("[Ijmportant
subsequent events (following the filing of an accurate... [quarterly] report) will
always render the required quarterly snapshot out-of-date." (quoting Amici Curiae
Brief in Support of Reversing the Judgement of the Trial Court of the Associated
Industries of Massachusetts & the New England Legal Foundation at 2,Backman v.
Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir 1990) (No. 89-117))), Oesterle, supra note 7. at
148-49 ("In theory, any important subsequent event could materially change the
impression left by any previous filing or voluntary disclosure.").
87. The approach taken by the First Circuit in Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814
F.2d 22 (1987), can be contrasted with the approach taken by the district court in A.H.
Robins and the First Circuit panel in Polaroid. In Roeder, Alpha was sued for failing
to disclose that it paid bribes to win a defense department subcontract. See id. at 23.
As a defense contractor, Alpha was likely required to discuss its compliance with
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Following the decision in Polaroid,most commentators believed,
and most federal courts have held, that a duty to update, to the extent
that it exists, applies to forward-looking statements and possibly other
non-historical statements. 8 Despite this general agreement, and
despite the fact that a duty to update historical factual statements
appears inseparable from a duty to disclose all material information,
one commentator has suggested that a recent First Circuit decision
has imposed a continuous disclosure obligation on any company that
files a shelf registration statement, 89 and that a recent Second Circuit
case can be read as an attempt to revive a duty to update historical

factual statements. 9°

In Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp.,91 Digital filed a "shelf"

registration statement with the Commission giving Digital the ability
to issue up to one billion dollars of various classes of debt and equity
securities.'
Several months later, Digital filed a prospectus
supplement and commenced an offering of securities four days prior
to the end of the third fiscal quarter of 1994. 93 The plaintiffs
complained that at the time of the offering Digital was aware of, and
should have disclosed that it was anticipating a significantly larger loss
for the third quarter than was expected by the market. 4 The First
Circuit held that the prospectus supplement was deficient because
Digital omitted material information. 95

One view holds that by

Department of Defense regulations in its annual report. Under the approach used by
the district court in A.H. Robins and in Polaroid,if Alpha had said in its annual report
that it was in compliance with DOD regulations, even if it was true at the time, when
Alpha paid the bribe it could have made the statement indicating compliance
"misleading." Instead of searching through Alpha's prior correct factual statements
to see if any of them became "misleading," the court in Roeder addressed the
plaintiffs' claims that Alpha had an affirmative duty to disclose all material
information. See id. at 27. The First Circuit in Roeder followed the rule stated in
Chiarella and held that there was no affirmative duty to disclose all material
information. See id.
88. See Gulati, supra note 14, at 714; Oesterle, supra note 7, at 149; Rosenblum,
supra note 9, at 317.
89. See Oesterle, supra note 7, at 137 (discussing Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82
F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996)).
90. See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259,267-68 (2d Cir. 1993).
91. 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996).
92. See id. at 1200. Under SEC Rule 415, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415, certain large
sophisticated companies are permitted to file a registration statement to cover the
offering of securities that they reasonably expect may be issued over a two year
period with only the barest information concerning the offering. See 17 C.F.R. §
230.415 (1999). The securities are said to be on "the shelf." When ready to sell the
securities, the company files a prospectus supplement, which provides the details
regarding the specific securities to be offered, the details of the offering and updated
information regarding the company. The securities are then said to be taken down
from the shelf and the offering commences.
93. See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1200.
94. See id.

95. See id. at 1202-03. The plaintiff and the court were really suggesting that the
prospective supplement should have been amended or updated to disclose
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requiring the disclosure of management's expectations relative to
market expectations, the court in essence was imposing a continuous
disclosure requirement for the entire period that the registration
statement is outstanding. 96 In fact, the court used the words
"continuous disclosure" stating: "[tihe rule permits offerings to be
made on a 'continuous' or 'delayed' basis because it envisions
'continuous' disclosure."'
The case should, however, be read less broadly. Despite the
language in Rule 415 permitting offerings on a "continuous" basis, in
reality, most shelf offerings are made periodically and not
continuously. 98 A more appropriate reading of the case would require
a company selling securities under a shelf registration statement to
include all material information through the date of the offering in its
registration statement" as opposed to simply satisfying its periodic
disclosure obligations.1°° The court made clear that Digital was
required to disclose information about the quarter in progress not
simply because Digital had filed a shelf registration statement, but
because it was actually selling securities under the shelf registration
statement, and it could have avoided any disclosure requirement by
delaying the sale of securities. 10 ' Instead of imposing a continuous
disclosure obligation, Digital represents an application of the insider
trading doctrine to the situation of a company selling its securities

information about the quarter in progress.
96. See Oesterle, supra note 7, at 142-43.
97. Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1209.
98. Rule 415(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a) (1999), states that "[s]ecurities may be
registered for an offering to be made in the future on a continuous or delayed basis in
the future .. "
99. Mechanically, a company could include all material information in its
registration statement by filing a post-effective amendment, filing a prospectus
supplement, stickering the prospective supplement and delivering it to the buyer, or
by filing a Form 8-K disclosing the material information (which under the
Commission's rules would be incorporated into the registration statement).
100. Digital had argued that it should be under no obligation to disclose any
information regarding the current fiscal quarter until its next Form 10-Q was required
to be filed with the Commission (which, pursuant to Commission rules, would be
automatically incorporated into the registration statement). See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1209.
101. See id at 1209 n.20 ("Of course, if the issuer desires not to disclose the
information prior to quarter's end, then the flexibility of the shelf registration
procedure permits the issuer to 'delay' a planned offering until after the quarter is
completed and the results from the quarter are publicly reported."); see also
Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383 [1937-82
Transfer Binder-Accounting Series Releases] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,328, at
63,015 (March 3, 1982) (clarifying the disclosure requirements of a shelf registration
prior to an offering). The Commission stated that Rule 415(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. §
230.415(a)(2), and Item 512(a) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(a), discuss
when and how a shelf registration statement is required to be updated, and that the
rules made "clear that there is no need to maintain an accurate and current, or
'evergreen,' prospectus when no offers or sales are being made pursuant to the shelf
registration." Id
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under a shelf registration statement."° Alternatively, the court in
Digital could have relied upon Item 303 of Regulation S-K to support
the decision that the intra-quarterly information had to be disclosed." 3
Item 303 requires inclusion in a registration statement and periodic
filings of any "known trends or uncertainties" expected to have an
effect on sales or revenue. 1°4 To the extent that Digital was aware of
an emerging negative trend in earnings in the third quarter, Item 303
would require disclosure of the decline. 0 5
In In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation,1"6 the Second Circuit,

like the district court in A.H. Robins, failed to identify the types of
statements that would be subject to the duty to update. ° The
plaintiffs in In re Time Warner claimed that a number of statements

made by Time Warner became misleading over time. 0 8 Some of the
statements on which the plaintiffs based their case are clearly forwardlooking statements." 9

Other statements were arguably historical." 0

102. The court analogized the situation in Shaw to that in insider trading cases
where an insider or a corporation can avoid any disclosure obligation by refraining
from trading. See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1203-04. It has been argued, however, that the
insider trading doctrine does not clearly fit this sort of situation. See Gulati, supra
note 14, at 723.
103. Several courts have rejected claims based on Item 303 nnder the theory that
there is no private right of action for failure to comply with Item 303. See, e.g.. In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1419 n.7 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that
it is an open issue whether violations of Item 303 create an independent cause of
action, but declining to reach the issue); In re Canandaigua Sec. Litig., 944 F. Supp.
1202, 1209 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("It is far from certain that the requirement that there
be a duty to disclose under Rule lOb-5 may be satisfied by importing the disclosure
duties from S-K 303."). But see Wallace v. System & Computer Tech. Corp., No. 95CV-6303, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14677, at *89 (Sept. 22, 1997) (allowing a l0b-5 claim
to proceed predicated upon a violation of Item 303 noting that "disclosures mandated
by law are presumably material." (citation omitted)). Item 303, however, need not
provide a private right of action. Item 303 serves as a source of a disclosure duty
under section 11 of the Securities Act and Rule lOb-5. See Gulati, supra note 14, at
725-26.
104. Gulati, supra note 14, at 725 (emphasis omitted).
105. It has been argued that a claim based upon non-disclosure of intra-period
information is really a claim that current period forecasts should have been disclosed
(which are not required to be disclosed pursuant to Instruction 7 of Item 303(a)). See
id. at 716-17. Professor Gulati, however, makes a strong argument that this confuses
unripe hard data with forecasts of full quarter results. See id. at 717. Companies can
satisfy Item 303 with disclosure of known intra-period data that suggest an emerging
trend, without disclosing forecasts of the full quarter results. See id. Practically,
companies may choose to disclose their forecasts of the full quarter in order to satisfy
Item 303, but this is not the same as requiring disclosure of forecasts. See id. at 717-18.
106. 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).
107. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
108. See In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 262.

109. Statements that Time Warner "expected" to complete a strategic alliance
transaction within a certain time period, and claims by Time Warner that it was
seeking strategic alliance partnerships to raise capital became misleading once Time
Warner began to consider a stock sale instead of a strategic alliance. See id. at 266.
110. These include Time Warner's statements regarding ongoing talks, which the
plaintiff claimed became misleading when such talks did not proceed well. See id. at
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The court, however, made no effort to distinguish between the two.
In fact, the court suggested in a footnote that the duty to update could
apply to historical statements.' Time Warner made statements that
talks regarding a strategic alliance partnership were ongoing.' 2 The
court stated that "if this factual assertion ceased to be true, [Time
Warner] would have had an obligation to update their earlier
statements. 1 1 3 Although the court failed to address whether it
intended the duty to update to apply to historical factual statements,
the nature of the statement and the fact that the court used the words
"factual assertion" suggest that the duty might apply to all types of
statements.1 To the extent that In re Time Warner suggests that a
duty to update historical factual statements is different than a duty to
disclose all material information, or that the general rule that
disclosure of material information is not required absent a duty to
speak is no longer good law, In re Time Warnerstands alone."s
In contrast to a duty to update that would apply to historical factual
statements, a plausible basis exists for distinguishing a duty to update
forward-looking statements from a duty to disclose all material
information. In general, forward-looking statements are not required
to be disclosed,11 6 and are made much less frequently. Unlike
historical factual statements, a change in circumstances would render
a prior forward-looking statement "misleading" only if the change was
related to the forward-looking statement.
Forward-looking
statements, unlike historical factual statements, have been suggested
to contain an implicit representation that they will be updated if
circumstances change." 7
267.
111. See id. at 267 n.4.

112. See id
113. Id.
114. See id

115. See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995).
The court held:
No duty to update an historical statement can logically exist. By definition

an historical statement is addressing only matters at the time of the
statement. Thus, that circumstances subsequently change cannot render an
historical statement false or misleading. Absent a duty to speak, a company
cannot commit fraud by failing to disclose changed circumstances, with

respect to an historical statement.
See id; Gwyn & Matton, supra note 39, at 379 (stating that a company "cannot
logically be under a 'duty to update' a statement of fact").

116. Certain forward-looking information is required to be disclosed. Item 303 of
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1999), requires disclosure of presently known
trends reasonably expected to effect future sales, earning or liquidity, while disclosure

of other forward-looking information is encouraged. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303,
Instruction 7 (1999). The line separating the two is often blurry. See Mark S. Croft,
MD&A: The Tightrope of Disclosure,45 S.C. L. Rev. 477,484-86 (1994).
117. This is not to suggest agreement with the argument, but only that, unlike a

duty to update historical factual statements, a plausible argument can be made to
distinguish a duty to update forward-looking statements from a duty to disclose all
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The early existence of the duty to update forward-looking

statements rested upon the dubious support of A.H. Robins," 8 the

dicta in Polaroid,the Third Circuit opinion in Greenfield v. Heublein
Inc."9 in which the court announced an extremely broad duty to

update with no analysis or support,'120 and the Third Circuit's decision
in In re Phillips Petroleum Securities Litigation"' in which the duty to

update should have been limited to the specific facts in the case.
In several instances, the Commission's rules explicitly require
information contained in certain forms and schedules to be updated
when circumstances change. For example, under Rule 13d, any
person who acquires five percent or more of the outstanding shares of
a publicly traded corporation is generally required to file a Schedule

13D.122 Rule 13d-2 requires the Schedule 13D to be amended "[i]f any

material change occurs in the facts set forth in the [statement]."' '
Importantly, only information contained in specified forms and
schedules filed with the Commission, and not all information, is
explicitly required to be updated.'24

material information. Numerous commentators see a duty to update, even if limited
to forward-looking statements, to impose a duty to disclose all material information.
See Wander, supra note 85, at 1059 ("Although a narrower duty to update only 'socalled forward-looking' statements appears more palatable, in practice it would be an
unworkable and dangerous precedent.").
118. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979). Although the district court in dicta found a duty
to update, the Second Circuit reversed on other grounds and expressly refused to
address the issue of a duty to update. See id. at 118.
119. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984).
120. The court in Greenfield recited a broad duty to update stating "if a
corporation voluntarily makes a public statement that is correct when issued, it has a
duty to update that statement if it becomes materially misleading in light of
subsequent events." Id. at 758. The court in Greenfield was faced with the question of
whether Heublein was required to update factual statements. See id. at 755. The
NYSE had contacted Heublein regarding unusual trading activity in its stock during
the time in which the defendant was involved in merger negotiations with two
different parties. See id. at 754. In response to the NYSE request, Heublein stated
that it knew of no reason that would explain the activity in its stock. See id. The Third
Circuit concluded that as a matter of law the statement was not misleading when
made because there had been no agreement in principal regarding a merger. See id. at
759-60. Heublein argued that it was not required to update its statements because the
statement spoke only as to activity on the date the statement was made. See id. at 759.
The court determined that it did not have to reach the question because at no time
during the plaintiff's class period did Heublein reach an agreement in principle. This
case was decided before the Supreme Court's decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224 (1988), which rejected the agreement-in-principle test for determining
whether merger discussions are material. See id. at 236. Had this case been decided
after Basic, the court likely would have been forced to decide whether Heublein had a
duty to update under these facts.
121. 881 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1989).
122. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a) (1999).
123. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a).
124. Other examples of various updating requirements include information
regarding tender offers contained in a Schedule TO, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6(c),
information regarding issuer self-tender offers and going-private transactions
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In In re Phillips,the plaintiffs sued an entity controlled by T. Boone
Pickens for securities fraud based upon statements made in a
Schedule 13D filed with the Commission in the course of a hostile
tender offer.'1 In the Schedule 13D filing, and in press releases
announcing the tender offer, Pickens, who had been paid greenmail
following previous hostile tender offers, stated that he would not sell
his shares back to Phillips except on the same terms available to all
stockholders. 126 Ultimately, Pickens sold back the shares he had
acquired at a price significantly higher than that available to the other
stockholders. 2 The plaintiffs claimed that once Pickens' intentions
regarding the Phillips shares changed, he was required to
communicate his change of intentions.'2 The Third Circuit agreed,
stating that "[tihere can be no doubt that a duty exists to correct prior
statements, if the prior statements were true when made but
misleading if left unrevised."' 29
The specific language of Rule 13d-2 quite clearly imposes a duty to
provide additional disclosure when information in a Schedule 13D
filed with the Commission changes, and the rule would have provided
a sufficient basis for the court's holding. Unfortunately, the court
failed to clearly confine the duty to "correct prior statements" to those
statements made in a Schedule 13D, or to instances when the
Commission's rules clearly require updating. The court's ruling can
be, and has been, read to apply to any statement of intent or forwardlooking statement. 30
Over the ten years following the Polaroid decision, the federal
appellate courts generally have stated that the duty to update exists."'
contained in Schedule 13E-3,17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(d)(2) and 240.13e-4(e)(2).
125. See In re Phillips,881 F.2d at 1239.

126. See id.
127. See id. at 1240.

128. See id. at 1245.
129. Id
130. See, e.g., Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing
Philips as support for its holding that a duty to update could apply to statements made
by a company in its annual report regarding its future expectations for its debt-toequity ratio); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 170 n.41 (5th Cir. 1994) (same).
131. See Clay v. Riverwood Int'l Corp., 157 F.3d 1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[A]
duty to disclose may... be created by a defendant's previous decision to speak
voluntarily. Where a defendant's failure to speak would render the defendant's own
prior speech misleading or deceptive, a duty to disclose arises." (quoting Rudolph v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1043 (11th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original)));
In re International Bus. Machs. Corporate Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1998)
("A duty to update may exist when a statement, reasonable at the time it is made,
becomes misleading because of a subsequent event."); In re Burlington Coat Factory
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1431 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing affirmative duty to update);
Rubinstein, 20 F.3d at 170 n.41 (addressing the duty to update only in a footnote
stating: "[w]e note that, at least facially, it appears that defendants have a duty under
Rule 10b-5 to correct statements if those statements have become materially

misleading in light of subsequent events"); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d
259,267 (2d Cir. 1993) (same).
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Despite numerous cases in which the existence of the duty to update
was the central issue in the case, and the frequency with which the
duty to update has been stated to exist, no cases, however, provide
any rationale or basis for imposing a duty to update. In contrast, the
Seventh132Circuit explicitly has rejected the existence of the duty to
update.
The Third Circuit decision in Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co. 33
represents one of the more blatant examples of a court expressing
support for the duty to update without any explanation other than
citing to prior precedent. The court held that a statement made by
Quaker Oats about the company's general guideline for its debt-toequity ratio could require updating when Quaker Oats began
contemplating an acquisition which, if financed with debt, would
materially increase the ratio."M The Third Circuit, citing only In re
stated that "there can be do doubt" that the
Phillips for its holding,
135
duty to update exists.
The Second Circuit in In re Time Warner made equally broad
statements as the Weiner court with no more explanation. The
plaintiffs in In re Time Warner alleged that Time Warner, heavily in
debt, made statements regarding its efforts to find "international
'strategic partners' who would infuse billions of dollars of capital into
the company," but later "misrepresented the status of ongoing
partnership discussions and failed to disclose" the stock offering. 36
The court held: "when a corporation is pursuing a specific business
goal and announces that goal as well as an intended approach for
reaching it, it may come under an obligation to disclose other
approaches to reaching the goal when those approaches are under
active and serious consideration."' 37 As described earlier, the In re
Time Warner Court even failed to describe the types of statements
covered by such an obligation, and the statements by the court can be

132. See, e.g., Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1995).
The court stated that "[slome have argued that a duty to update arises when a
company makes a forward-looking statement-a projection-that because of
subsequent events becomes untrue.... This court has never embraced such a theory,
and we decline to do so now." Id. (citations omitted). The court further held that
Rule 10b-5 "implicitly precludes basing liability on circumstances that arise after the
speaker makes the statement." Id. In Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738 (7th
Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit went even further, stating that "it is true.., that in this
circuit, and maybe now in all circuits (as a result of the recent amendments to the
securities laws), there is no duty to correct a prediction falsified by subsequent
events ..." Id. at 744. The Seventh Circuit, however, has not been entirely
consistent. See infra notes 198-207 and accompanying text.
133. 129 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1997).
134. See id. at 317.
135. Id. at 316 (quoting In re Phillips Petroleum, 881 F.2d 1236, 1245 (3d Cir.
1989)).
136. In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 262.
137. Id. at 268.
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interpreted as applying the duty to update even to historical factual
statements.138

It appears that recent courts have felt bound by the decisions in
A.H. Robins, Greenfield, In re Phillips, and Polaroidto state that the
duty to update exists. Notwithstanding the decisions in Weiner and In
re Time Warner, the federal courts, even when stating that the duty to
update exists, have generally found reasons not to impose the duty to
update upon the facts in the particular cases at bar. Frequently, the
courts have avoided the application of the duty to update by
concluding that the forward-looking statement was immaterial, as
there can be no duty to update an immaterial statement. 13 9 The courts
have used three separate approaches to conclude that a statement is
not material. 14°
First, courts have relied on the "bespeaks caution" doctrine. The
bespeaks caution doctrine provides that if a forward-looking
statement is accompanied by sufficient cautionary language, the
statement is immaterial as a matter of law.' 41 In In re International
Business Machines Corporate Securities Litigation, IBM made

several statements concerning its plan to maintain its current dividend
levels in the face of mounting losses. 43 When ultimately forced to cut
its dividend payments, the plaintiffs claimed that IBM should have
updated its statements once the company realized that its dividend

138. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
139. See In re International Bus. Machs. Corporate Sec. Litig., 163 F-3d 102, 110
(2d Cir. 1998).
140. There is a significant body of case law concerning whether a forward-looking
statement is misleading when made. Cases involving a duty to update have often
borrowed from this line of cases. Frequently, the issues arise together, with plaintiffs
alleging that a forward-looking statement was misleading when made, or
alternatively, if not misleading when made, it "became misleading" at a later time
giving rise to a duty to update. See Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42
F.3d 204,219 (4th Cir. 1994).
141. See In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1993).
The court described the doctrine as follows:
[W]hen an offering document's forecasts, opinions or projections are
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements, the forward-looking
statements will not form the basis for a securities fraud claim if those
statements did not affect the "total mix" of information the document
provided investors. In other words. cautionary language, if sufficient.
renders the alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter
of law.
Id. at 371. The courts also have held that sufficient cautionary language can nullify
any potentially misleading effect of a forward-looking statement. See Grossman v.
Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1120 (10th Cir. 1997); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig..
35 F.3d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 185 (1995). See generally
Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine:It's Not Just a State
of Mind, 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 619, 630-38 (1997) (analyzing the bespeaks caution
doctrine).
142. 163 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1998).
143. See id at 105.
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levels could not be maintained.1 " The Second Circuit concluded that
sufficient cautionary language existed to indicate that the statements
were only short-term predictions, rendering the statements
immaterial. 45 In San Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit
Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos.,' 46 the Second Circuit found as a
matter of law that statements made by Philip Morris regarding its

product pricing strategies were not misleading when accompanied by
statements
indicating the difficulty in predicting the strategy's
147

impact.
A second approach courts have taken to find a statement not to be
material is to find that clear statements of specific projections are no
more than general expressions of optimism, or are simply too vague,

to be considered material. 48 In In re Burlington Coat Factory
Securities Litigation,'49 a Burlington Coat Factory ("BCF") officer
stated that he believed that BCF's net earnings would continue to
grow at a rate faster than sales. 5 0 The Third Circuit concluded that
the statement was a "general, non-specific statement of optimism or
hope that a trend will continue."''
The court then held that the
statement was vague and thus immaterial as a matter of law. 5 The
statement made by BCF appears to have been anything but vague.
BCF spoke of two clear, quantifiable concepts, and BCF was equally
clear as to the relationship of the two. 5 3 Only the rate of growth of
either sales or earnings, or the amount earnings growth was expected
to exceed sales growth, was unclear."5 The simple fact that earnings
growth was expected to exceed sales growth, however, would have
been particularly important to many investors. 55
A third approach courts have taken to avoid finding a statement
material is to hold that a projection is immaterial unless worded as a
144. See id. at 109.
145. See id. at 108.
146. 75 F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 1996).
147. See id. at 811.
148. See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259,267 (2d Cir. 1993).
149. 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997).
150. See id. at 1427.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 1427-28. In re Burlington Coat Factory has been read as holding that
a duty to update applies only when a forward-looking statement concerns
fundamental changes in the nature of a company. See In re Home Health Corp. of
America, Inc. Sec. Litig., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1230, at *55 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 1999).
153. See In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1427.
154. Id.
155. First, such a statement implies that earnings are expected to grow which is in
and of itself material. Second, sales growth rates are generally easier to predict than
earnings growth rates, as earnings are affected not only by sales but also by a variety
of other factors. If an investor knew that management believed that earnings growth
rates would exceed sales growth rates, and if he could predict a company's sales
growth (either based on information provided by the company or otherwise), he
would be able to approximate management's projections of earnings.
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guarantee. In IBM, the Second Circuit, in addition to relying on the
bespeaks caution doctrine, stated that the statements by IBM were
opinions and not guarantees and therefore were immaterial as a
matter of law. 156 The court reached this conclusion despite the fact
that the statements were undeniably clear. On several occasions, IBM
stated that it had no intention of cutting its $1.21 per share dividend.1'
The Fourth Circuit has held similarly. In Hilson Partners Ltd.
Partnership v. Adage, Inc.,' the plaintiffs alleged that Adage made
numerous forward-looking statements predicting record earnings, and
that Adage had a duty to update the predictions when the company
realized the predicted earnings levels would not be met. 59 The court
held that predictions of sales growth or earnings projections, even
when specifically quantified, were immaterial as a matter of law."W
In addition to relying on concepts of immateriality to avoid
application of the duty to update, the courts have also recognized that
companies have a legitimate need for confidentiality.
In San
Leandro,16' Philip Morris made statements about its product pricing
strategy."6 When Phillip Morris subsequently announced that it was
changing its strategy, the plaintiffs sued, claiming Phillip Morris
should have updated its earlier statements when it first began to
consider changing its strategy.'
The Second Circuit rejected the
plaintiffs' claims stating that it was "concerned... about interpreting
the securities laws to force companies to give their competitors
advance notice of sensitive pricing information."''
Finally, courts have narrowly construed the scope of the original
statement, finding no duty to update if the undisclosed information is
outside the scope of the original statement. In Evanowski v.
Bankworcester Corp., 6 the defendant announced that it had received
a cash merger proposal at $22.50 per share.'6 The merger was subject
to certain conditions, which the defendant was ultimately unable to
meet.167
Subsequently, the defendant and the bidder began

156. See In re International Bus. Machs. Corporate Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 107
(2d Cir. 1998).
157. See id. at 108. The court stated that "[i]t would be unreasonable, as a matter
of law, for an investor to rely on these projections as long-term guarantees." Id.
158. 42 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1994).

159. See id at 208.
160. See id at 212 (relying on its prior decisions in Rabb v. General Physics Corp.,
4 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 1993) and Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471 (4th Cir.

1994)).
161. 75 F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 1996).

162 See id at 805-07.
163. See id. at 805.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id at 809-10.
788 F. Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1991).
See id at 612.
See id. at 613.
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renegotiating at a substantially reduced price.1'6 The defendant made
several statements that the negotiations were continuing without
disclosing that they were discussing a deal on substantially different
terms. 169 In a truly strained reading of the original statement 7 ' the
court held that the statement was precisely correct and the fact that
the parties were renegotiating core terms of the deal was outside the
Although the original statement
scope of the original statement.'
may have remained technically correct, the terms of the
renegotiations were substantially different from those described in the
original statement.
Cases such as Hillson, IBM and Burlington Coat Factory strongly
suggest that the federal courts are attempting to avoid the application
of the duty to update, or to so narrow the scope of the duty to update
that it will cease to exist.'72 If a duty to update were going to be
imposed, the facts of these three cases seemingly presented the best
opportunity to apply the duty. Hillson involved clear statements
regarding expectations that the company would exceed a specific
amount of earnings, IBM involved concrete statements as to
expectations of maintaining a specific dividend rate, and Burlington
Coat Factory involved specific earnings projections.
The extent to which the courts in Hillson, IBM, and Burlington
Coat Factory have gone to avoid the application of the duty to update
appears to be the result of their concern for the burdens that would be
associated with imposing a duty to update. The Fourth Circuit in
Hillson stated:
To require Adage continually to correct and modify its projections
would inevitably discourage the types of disclosure the securities
laws seek to encourage.... Because of the frequency and volatility
of these projections, the imposition of a duty to disclose them would
have required virtually constant statements by [the issuer] in order
not to mislead investors. Under these circumstances, we deem the
urged by [appellant] to be impractical, if not
projection disclosures
73
unreasonable.
168. See id.
169. See id.

170. For criticism of the Evanowski decision, see Oesterle, supra note 7, at 185-87.
171. See Evanowski, 788 F. Supp. at 614.
172. Indeed, the Third Circuit, after acknowledging that it had previously found a
duty to update in In re Phillips and Greenfield, seemed to suggest that a duty to
update might not exist at all. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d
1410, 1433-34 (3d Cir. 1997). The court stated that "the duty to update, to the extent
it might exist, would be a narrow one." Id. at 1434 n.20. The court also stated that
although they had previously recognized that a duty to update might exist in In re
Phillips and Greenflield, they had never clarified the circumstances when it might
apply. See id. at 1431-32; see also Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc.. 42
F.3d 204, 219 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Assuming that there can ever be a 'duty to update,'
there was no such duty here.").
173. Hillson, 42 F.3d at 219 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
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The Fourth Circuit recognized the burdens that an almost continuous
disclosure regime would impose on reporting companies.
The Third Circuit has expressed similar concerns regarding the
potentially overwhelming burdens corporations would face with a
duty to update. In Burlington Coat Factory, a company officer, in
addition to stating that he believed that BCF's earnings would
continue to grow faster than sales, also expressed comfort with analyst
projections of BCF's earnings. 174 The court expressed great concern
that if a duty to update was imposed in this case, it would create a
continuous duty to update the earning forecasts. 17 The court was not
convinced that a single, ordinary, run-of-the-mill earnings forecast
contained an implicit representation that the company would update
176
the market with all material information relevant to the forecast.
Finally, the court expressed concern that a "judicially created rule that
triggers a duty of continuous disclosure.., would likely result in a
drastic reduction in the number of such projections" which would be
contrary to the intent of the federal securities laws1 77 The court
concluded that for these reasons, a duty7 8 to update would not be
imposed upon ordinary earnings forecasts.
The concern that the courts have expressed for the burdens
associated with a broadly applied duty to update, when combined with
the efforts to which the courts have gone to avoid the application of
the duty to update, demonstrates that the support for the duty to
update is neither firm nor widespread. Cases such as Hillson, IBM,
and Burlington Coat Factory beg the question of whether the duty to
update should exist at all.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DUTIES TO
CORRECT AND UPDATE

Part II addressed the courts' reluctance to find the existence of
either a duty to correct or a duty to update. Part III of this Article
examines existing justifications for the duties, concluding they are
scant. Further, a duty to update would be inconsistent with the
federal securities laws and a duty to correct superfluous.

Walker v. Action Indus., 802 F.2d 703, 710 (4th Cir. 1986)).
174. See In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1428. The court concluded that

a corporate officer's expression of comfort with an analyst's projections was
tantamount to the corporate officer making the projection directly. See id.

175. See id. at 1433.
176. See id
177. 1d
178. See id. at 1433-34.
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A. Duty to Correct
Although acceptance that a duty to correct does and should exist
appears to be nearly universal,179 no one has attempted to articulate
the purpose of such a duty or why one is needed. 80 In order to invoke
the duty to correct, a material misstatement must first exist. A
material misstatement or material omission made in a registration
statement or a prospectus is actionable under section 11 of the
Securities Act.18 1 Issuers of securities are strictly liable for such
misstatements or omissions," and, therefore, a duty to correct such
statements would be superfluous. Any other materially misleading
statement or material omission, whether made in an Exchange Act
filing, a press release, or a statement made to securities analysts, is
actionable under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5, if
made with the requisite level of scienter.18 3 If such a material
misstatement is made with scienter, the maker would face liability and

there is no need to imply a duty to correct.
The duty to correct has been stated as not really applying in a
situation where a company makes an inaccurate statement (i.e., this
would be a violation in and of itself) but only "operates simply as a
means of limiting existing"'" liability. Under one scenario, however, a
179. See Brill, supra note 39, at 617 ("The courts and authorities have not
questioned the existence of this duty to correct."); Hayes, supra note 86, at 953
("Under 10b-5(2), the corporation clearly has an affirmative duty to correct
statements it made that were inaccurate when made." (emphasis added)).
180. But see, e.g., Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 289 (attempting to rationalize the
existence of a duty to correct). In discussing the duties to update and correct,
Rosenblum states that despite the "near unanimity of courts in acknowledging an
issuer's duty to correct ....relatively few courts have purported to impose liability
for the breach of either duty, and few of the cases have attempted to provide a
detailed explanation of the bases of those duties." Id. at 314-15.
181. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)-(a)(1) (1999). The statute reads:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to
state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security
[may sue] every person who signed the registration statement.
182. See id. All persons other than the issuer have a due diligence defense. See 15
U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3).
183. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-214 (1976) (holding that
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act's language embodies a scienter requirement);
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (stating that the word
manipulative in section 10(b) "refers generally to practices... that are intended to
mislead investors by artificially affecting the market activity."). In the context of Rule
lOb-5, the federal courts have generally held that it is enough for a company to be
aware that a statement was inaccurate and of its propensity to mislead, or to be
reckless as to the accuracy of the statement. See SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629
F.2d 62, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
184. Cox et al., Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials 714 (2d ed. 1997). By
correcting prior inaccurate disclosure, a company would limit the potential class of
plaintiffs to those who purchased or sold stock prior to the date of the correction. See
id.
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duty to correct could potentially serve a purpose. If a company
innocently makes a material misstatement, other than in a Securities
Act registration statement, no scienter would exist, and no liability
would arise. At some later point, if the company realized its error, but
failed to correct it, its subsequent failure to correct could potentially
be used to provide the missing scienter.1
No cases appear to have addressed the exact fact pattern described
above. In In re MobileMedia,' one of the few cases to actually
impose liability for failure to comply with the duty to correct, the
court did not address whether scienter existed at the time of the
misstatement, and thus whether there was any need to address a duty
to correct. 187
Whether the discovery of a misstatement with no other action on
the part of a company would be sufficient to find scienter is unclear.
Merely discovering the inaccuracy is not sufficient." Some additional
action or reason for the company to benefit from failing to correct the
misstatement would likely be necessary to find an intent to deceive.""
It is not enough that the failure to correct a known misstatement is
unfair,' it must also be fraudulent.' In addition, in order to make
out a colorable claim of securities fraud, a plaintiff must comply with
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that
fraud be pleaded with particularity.1' If the plaintiff cannot identify a
185. See Oesterle, supra note 7, at 147-48.
186. 28 F. Supp. 2d 901 (D.NJ. 1998).
187. Nor did the court address the proper class period, which presumably would

begin only when the material misstatement was discovered, as opposed to when the
misstatement was originally made. Had the court addressed the issue of the proper
class period, it might have been forced to conclude that a plaintiff who purchased a
security after the material misstatement, but prior to the time the company learned of
the misstatement, would not be entitled to damages because no scienter existed at the

time of the misstatement. Additionally, it would have concluded that a later buyer of
the same security who purchased her stock after the company learned of the

misstatement but failed to correct it would be entitled to damages based upon the
material misstatement that caused the loss to both. Imagining that a court would treat
two plaintiffs so differently when both were equally harmed by the misstatement is
difficult, yet this result would seem to be required by a duty to correct. To see how
the court did address the issue, see In re MobileMedia Securities Litigation, 28 F.
Supp. 901,923 (D.NJ. 1998).
188. See In re HealthCare Compare Corp. Sec. Litig., 75 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 1996).
The Seventh Circuit held that a company could be liable for failure to correct a
forward-looking statement but held that the case must be dismissed because the
plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead motive and intent. See id. at 283.

189. See Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 318-19 ("lAin issuer who had nothing to gain
from an increase or decrease in the price of its securities caused by its breach of a duty
to correct or update is less likely to have had the requisite intent to support a Rule
10b-5 violation.").

190. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,473 (1977).
191. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) ("There must also be 'manipulation
or deception."' (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,472 (1997))).

192. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 (3d Cir.
1997) (stating that a plaintiff must "allege specific facts that give rise to a 'strong
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tangible benefit to the company from failing to correct the
misstatement, he is unlikely to survive a motion to dismiss. But in
many cases where a company would receive such a tangible benefit
sufficient to overcome the Rule 9(b) pleading requirements, a remedy
would exist without the necessity of resorting to a duty to correct. For
instance, if a company were to discover that it had made a material
misstatement by underestimating the value of the company or its
earning potential, and then proceeded to repurchase its stock without
correcting the misstatement, this would clearly be fraudulent. The
actions of the company would, however, constitute insider trading
under existing case law, making an independent duty to correct
unnecessary. 193 Thus, the practical reality is that even in narrow
situations where a duty to correct might provide a remedy for a
misstatement where one would not otherwise exist, a plaintiff would
be unlikely to overcome the Rule 9(b) pleading requirements.
Even if the pleading and scienter requirements are met, a strong
argument exists that the language of Rule 10b-5 does not permit
examining events that occur after a statement is made. The language
of Rule 10b-5 implies that the determination of whether a misleading
statement is actionable must be made as of the time the statement was
made. The Seventh Circuit in Stransky has espoused this view, 94 in
addition to at least one commentator.1 95 If statements must be judged
at the time they are made, the subsequent discovery of a misstatement
cannot be used to provide the scienter missing at the time of the
misstatement.
The duty to correct has generally been discussed in the context of
historical factual statements. There have recently been arguments
96
made to extend the duty to correct to forward-looking statements.
A forward-looking statement that is misleading when made, such as a
projection based upon inaccurate data, has been suggested as possibly
triggering a duty to correct in addition to any duty to update that
might be triggered upon a subsequent change of circumstance.19'
Extending the duty to correct a forward-looking statement that is
misleading when made, is extremely troubling. It represents an effort
by plaintiffs, aware of efforts by the federal courts to narrow or avoid
completely the application of the duty to update, to recharacterize a
inference' that the defendant possessed the requisite intent.").
193. This is the basic fact pattern from Shattuck Denn Mining discussed supra at
notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
194. See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The
rule implicitly precludes basing liability on circumstances that arise after the speaker
makes the statement.").
195. See Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 307.
196. See In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1431 ("We have no quarrel with
the Stransky articulation, except to note that we think the duty to correct can also
apply to a certain narrow set of forward-looking statements").
197. See id.
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duty to update a claim as a duty to correct a claim. The plaintiff's
effort to recharacterize a duty to correct is best illustrated by the
Seventh Circuit case of In re HealthCare Compare Corp. Securities
Litigation.19 8 In early February 1993, HealthCare Compare expressed
comfort with analyst projections of its net income for fiscal 1993.'1
On February 24, an internal memorandum was prepared that lowered
internal estimates of fiscal 1993 revenues and net income.-' At the
end of March, HealthCare Compare then expressed discomfort with
analysts' estimates." 1 When the company's stock price dropped
following this statement, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging securities
fraud, claiming that HealthCare Compare was required to "correct"
the February 1993 statement. 20 2 The plaintiffs also claimed that
factual information was available prior to the February expressions of
comfort that should have alerted HealthCare Compare that it was not
on track to meet analyst expectations. 203
The defendants argued that based upon the Seventh Circuit's
earlier decision in Stransky v. Cummins Engine, they had no duty to
update. The court replied:
Reliance on Stransky is somewhat misplaced.... This is not a case
where things unexpectedly went wrong; rather, plaintiffs allege that
the circumstances which made the comfort statements false ... arose
prior to the statements-even if only realized by HealthCare on
February 24.
Thus we decline to hold that Stransky adopted a bright-line rule
that no duty to correct exists in any case. Rather, we are persuaded
that plaintiffs can only show that a duty to correct arose by alleging
facts sufficient to demonstrate that the internal memorandum was
certain and reliable, not merely a tentative estimate. 2"
The court's decision is somewhat difficult to decipher. -0 The court
apparently meant that if the data used to arrive at the lower earnings
estimate in the February 24th memorandum existed at the time the
earlier statement was made, even if the defendant was not aware the
data existed or had yet to process the data and arrive at the new lower
198. 75 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 1996).
199. See id. at 278.
200. See id
201. See id.

202. See id. at 278-79.
203. See id. at 279.
204. Id. at 282.

205. Despite the pains taken by the Seventh Circuit in Stransky to differentiate
between the "duty to correct" and the "duty to update", the court in In re HealthCare
Compare misuses the terms. For instance, the court stated that in Stransky, it had
"declined to find a duty to correct," despite the fact that the issue in Stransky was
whether or not to recognize a duty to update. See id. In re HealthCare Compare
appears to involve a duty to correct because the circumstances giving rise to the
plaintiffs allegations arose prior to the forward-looking statements, but were
recognized by HealthCare Compare only after the statements were made. See id.
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earnings estimate, then the earlier earnings estimate was incorrect and
required correction.
The extension of the duty to correct to forward-looking statements
suffers from all of the problems previously identified.2 ° More
importantly, extending the duty to correct to forward-looking
statements would in many circumstances serve as a substitute for a
duty to update. In a situation where a duty to correct a forwardlooking statement would apply, a duty to update, if one exists, would
also apply. In jurisdictions that have rejected or limited the duty to
update, plaintiffs could simply recharacterize their duty to update
claim to allege a duty to correct. 2°7 For example, assume a situation
similar to that in A.H. Robins. A company develops a new product
that it believes to be safe and effective based upon all research done
up to that point, and it issues a press release to that effect.
Subsequently, additional research shows that the product is either not
as effective as first thought or is in some way dangerous. Obviously, if
the product is not now safe and effective, it was not safe and effective
when the original statement was made, and it could be argued that the
forward-looking statement was incorrect when made and requires
correcting. Clearly, if a duty to update exists, it would apply here.
Importantly, in both In re MobileMedia and In re HealthCare
Compare the defendant companies corrected their prior
misstatements. The plaintiffs were not complaining because the
defendants failed to correct their misstatements but because they did
not correct their misstatements soon enough. A company's correction
of its misstatement would seem to be the most likely way for a
stockholder of the company to learn of the misstatement. The
existence of a duty to correct may therefore create a disincentive for a
company to correct its errors, because if the company's stock price
drops following the correction, plaintiffs will allege the company must
have known about the misstatement at some point prior to the
correction.
Ultimately, the creation of the duty to correct is unwarranted. The
duty to correct appears to be a remedy in search of a problem. With
limited exceptions, when a material misstatement is made, a remedy
will exist without the need to create a duty to correct. Even in factual
situations where the duty to correct might provide a remedy for a
misstatement where one would not otherwise exist, the application of
the duty to correct is problematic. The absence of scienter would
likely limit the application of the duty to correct in many
circumstances, and the language of 10b-5 may preclude the use of the
206. See supra notes 179-205 and accompanying text.
207. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., Promises Made, Promises Kept: The Practical
Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 San Diego L.
Rev. 845, 857 (1996) ("[I]t takes only a deft keyboard stroke to allege that a duty to
update was in fact a duty to correct." (emphasis omitted)).
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doctrine altogether. In addition, companies that voluntarily correct
their past misstatements, as the defendants did in In re MobileMedia
and In re HealthCare Compare, leave themselves vulnerable to claims
that they failed to correct the misstatement soon enough. The limited
utility of the duty to correct is outweighed by both the increased
litigation risk imposed upon public companies that wish voluntarily to
correct their innocent errors and the danger of encouraging the
creation of other implied disclosure obligations.
B.

Duty to Update

Section B discusses the difficulty of complying with the duty to
update, and the normative justifications for the duty. The section
further addresses the Commission's stance on the duty to update,
traditional doctrine with respect to the duty, and the effect of the
Reform Act on the duty.
1.

Compliance with a Duty to Update

Compliance with a duty to update places a heavy burden on
companies. As previously discussed, if firms were required to update
historical factual statements, such a duty to update would be
indistinguishable from a requirement to disclose all material
information, in essence creating a continuous disclosure
requirement.'
A duty to update forward-looking statements would
create a similar continuous disclosure requirement.' ° The problems
associated with a continuous disclosure requirement have been
extensively discussed in the academic literature.1 0
Two problems are generally recognized as being associated with a
continuous disclosure system. First, firms would be required to
disclose information that they would prefer not to disclose.2 "
Information firms would prefer to keep confidential include
208. See supra notes 67-86 and accompanying text.
209. The burden on firms would maybe be somewhat less as firms generally make
fewer forward-looking statements as compared to the number of historical factual
statements. A change of circumstances would not necessarily create a disclosure
obligation, as a disclosure obligation would arise only to the extent that a firm had

previously made a forward-looking statement related to the change in circumstances,
while a change in circumstance would almost always bear upon a previous historical
factual statement. But see Wander et al., supra note 85, at 1064 ("Because of the
compliance difficulties it presents, acceptance of even a limited duty to update would
eviscerate the traditional rule that issuers have no general duty to disclose.").
210. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities
Disclosure, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 763, 770 (1995) (criticizing the SEC for -fail[ing] to
consider... the importance of issuer concerns arising out of the value of information
in competitive markets"); Paul G. Mahoney, Technology, Property Rights in

Information, and Securities Regulation, 75 Wash. U. LQ. 815, 817-23 (1997)
(discussing problems associated with a continuous disclosure requirement).
211. See generally Mahoney, supra note 210, at 818 ("Disclosure of corporate
information also carries the risk of liability.").
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information that harms a firm's competitive balance, such as the
existence of preliminary merger discussions where secrecy concerning
the transaction may affect a firm's ability to consummate the
Second, a continuous disclosure system would
transaction.
"exacerbate the problems facing a legal system that is already overly
litigious. ' 212 This second problem has been referred to as the "liability
cost" of mandated disclosure." 3
Imposing a duty to update forward-looking statements would
impose an even higher liability cost than would a continuous
disclosure system that only required disclosure of factual information.
A duty to update would do more than just force a corporation to
update its prior forward-looking statements once the corporation
knew that results were not going to be as predicted. A duty to update
would require a company to update its prior statements any time
additional information cast doubt on the prior prediction or, if the
company were to generate a new prediction, it would cause the
corporation to formulate a different prediction. A duty to update may
go further and require a company to update its predictions whether or
not it actually had gathered and evaluated new information or
generated a new prediction. For example, if a corporation in the first
week of January released an estimate of its earnings for the full year,
the estimate would have to be updated immediately once any new
information existed that might change the estimate, even if this
change of estimate occurred the following day. In essence, this would
create a continuous duty to reevaluate prior predictive statements.
Predictions, to be reasonable, have to be based upon all available
information at the time they are made. Most large companies have
entire departments dedicated to gathering information on a regular
basis and extrapolating that information to make predictions about
the future. Because many large companies on a regular and quite
frequent basis might develop new predictions, or at least have
information available to make new predictions, the required
disclosure of forward-looking statements could truly become
continuous and require up-to-the minute updating.
Trends are easy to spot in hindsight. They are not so easy to see
when they happen in real time. When a previously successful
company later falls on hard times, it is easy to look back at various
points and suggest that the company should have recognized that the
tide was beginning to turn. In a continuous disclosure system, it is
plaintiffs who look back and say that the company should have told
212. Oesterle, supra note 7, at 191. Professor Oesterle characterizes these concerns
as specious because such concerns assume that it is impossible to design a continuous
disclosure system that would be without exceptions, and with which private litigation
would be unimpeded. See id. at 188-89. Given our current system, even Professor
Oesterle agrees that such concerns are legitimate.
213. See Mahoney, supra note 210, at 817-19.
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them lean times were coming. Management, continually in the
maelstrom, must examine each new data point to determine if it
represents a departure from the past and from what is expected. For
plaintiffs in subsequent litigation, the question becomes: What did you
know and when did you know it?
When the continuous disclosure obligations are applied to forwardlooking statements, the minutia become even more important to
management in determining when they have a disclosure obligation,
because the problem is not one of deciding whether there is enough
new information to determine that a change is in the offing, but
whether there is enough information that would justify a new and
different prediction. For the plaintiffs in subsequent litigation, the
question becomes: What did you believe, and when did you believe it?
Even if companies were to update their prior predictions,
determining when to update would still be a daunting task.
Determining materiality almost always involves difficult judgement
calls. If disclosure obligations are tied to discrete points in time or to
the occurrence of specified events, companies face a limited number
of difficult disclosure decisions. In a continuous disclosure system, the
number of difficult disclosure decisions is multiplied exponentially,
with each decision subject to being second guessed in subsequent
litigation.214

Take, for example, a small oil and gas exploration company, for
which each new well is a material event. Part of the nature of energy
exploration is that its ultimate success or the degree of success of a
well may not be known for years after it is drilled, and as a result
almost any information disclosed about a well will have a forwardlooking component. In the absence of a duty to update, the
exploration company, unless it was required to file a quarterly or
annual report or was in the process of selling its securities, could
choose the point or points at which to disclose information about the
progress of the well. The company would likely choose to make
disclosures at points at which it felt it had sufficient information to
make an educated guess as to the prognosis of the well. It is not
unusual for the prognosis of a well to change many times throughout
the drilling and testing process. If a duty to update were to apply, the
company would have to update its statements with each change in
214. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1432 (3d Cir.
1997) (stating that BCF would be subjected to a "continuous duty to update the
public with either forecasts or hard information that would in anyway change a
reasonable investor's perception of the originally forecasted range"); Hillson Partners
Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F3d 204, 219 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Because of the
frequency and volatility of these projections, the imposition of a duty to disclose them
would have required virtually constant statements by [Adage] in order not to mislead
investors. Under these circumstances, we deem the projection disclosures urged by
[plaintiffs] to be impractical, if not unreasonable." (quoting Walker v. Action Indus.,
802 F.2d 703,710 (4th Cir. 1986))).
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prognosis. Each new prediction may only be marginally more likely
to prove true than the prior prediction. The predictions may change
from optimistic to pessimistic and back again and again.
A different disclosure problem is illustrated by the Weiner 15 and
San Leandro216 cases. In Weiner, Quaker Oats had on several
occasions announced that its guideline for leverage would be to
maintain a total debt-to-total capitalization ratio in the upper 60%
range.21 7 At some point, Quaker Oats began negotiating to acquire
Snapple, and ultimately reached an agreement to acquire Snapple for
1.07 billion. Quaker Oats financed the acquisition entirely through
new debt, which raised its debt-to-equity ratio to approximately
80%.218 The plaintiffs sued Quaker Oats for failing to update its
guideline for its debt-to-equity ratio when it became apparent that the
impending acquisition of Snapple would significantly raise its leverage
ratio.21 9
In San Leandro, the plaintiffs sued Philip Morris after it announced
that it was cutting the price of its Marlboro cigarettes. 220 The plaintiffs
claimed that the price cut represented a change in pricing strategy and
that Philip Morris 221
should have disclosed that its was considering the
change in strategy.
Importantly, although the plaintiffs' claims in Weiner and San
Leandro were couched as a failure to update prior statements, the
defendants did update their predictions. Furthermore, it was the
market's adverse reaction to the update that led to the lawsuit.
Instead, plaintiffs were actually claiming that the predictions were not
updated soon enough. What the plaintiffs in Weiner and San Leandro
really wanted was for the companies to disclose the potential negative
effects of a change in corporate strategy at the point the change came
under consideration. In effect, they wanted disclosure of the effect on
prior statements of potential future decisions prior to such decisions
even being made.
2.

What Statements Require Updating?

Even if a duty to update does not apply to historical statements, it
can still be quite difficult to determine what statements require
updating. Determining whether a statement is factual, or whether it
has a forward-looking connotation is not always clear. Often, a
statement involves both factual aspects and expectations for the
215. 129 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1997).
216. 75 F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 1996).
217. See Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310,313 (3d Cir. 1997).
218. See id.
219. See id. at 314.
220. See San Leandro Emergency Med. Plan. v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 805
(2d. Cir. 1996).
221. See id.
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Recall the situation in In re Time Warner. Time Warner

made statements that it was engaged in negotiations with a number of
parties regarding a strategic alliance, and that it would complete a
transaction within a certain time period that would involve a
substantial capital infusion.?3 These facts gave the court a fair
amount of difficulty. Surely, part of the statements were forwardlooking, such as the expectation as to the results of the negotiations or
the time period for completing the transaction. But, parts of the
statements were also purely factual. Time Warner stated that
discussions were ongoing,"- 4 which seems to be a statement of pure
fact that is verifiable. If a statement is partially forward-looking, must
a company update the entirety of the statement, even the factual
portion?
To complicate matters further, some commentators have suggested
that categories of statements in addition to historical factual
statements and forward-looking statements may also require
updating.' Substantial uncertainty exists as to how soft information
that does not fall within the definition of forward-looking statements
in Rule 175 and the Reform Act should be treated.
A "statement of intent" has been suggested to be a category of
statement separate
from a forward-looking
statement. 6
Unfortunately, determining exactly what a statement of intent is or
how it differs from a forward-looking statement is impossible. The
Third Circuit in Phillips first described a statement of intent.-' The
statements at issue were made in a Schedule 13D which described the
filer's intent regarding the shares of stock it had acquired, as required
by the Item 4 of Schedule 13D. - Rule 13d-2 explicitly requires the
Schedule 13D to be updated if the information changes. In holding
that the information in the Schedule 13D had to be updated, the court
failed to base its decision solely on Rule 13d-2, and the idea that
statements of intent occupy some separate category of statement has

222 See Stephen J. Schulte, Corporate Public Disclosure: Primer for the

Practitioner,15 Cardozo L. Rev. 971. 984 (1994) ("There simply is no 'bright line' test
between initially accurate statements which should be updated and those which need

not be."); Wander, supra note 14, at 1064 ("To distinguish statements of present fact
from purely speculative and forward-looking disclosure is practically impossible.").
223. See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259,262 (2d Cir. 1993).
224. See id. at 262-63.
225. See infra notes 226-30.
226. See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329. 1332 n.4 (7th Cir. 1995)
("We express no opinion on whether the outcome would be the same if a plaintiff
contested statements of intent to take a certain action."), Gwyn & Matton, supra note
39 at 367 (suggesting that even if the Reform Act eliminated the duty to update for
forward-looking statements, companies would still be required to update statements
of intent).
227. See In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236. 1245 (3d Cir. 1989).
228. See id. at 1239.
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been perpetuated ever since. 229 There is no analytical reason to treat
statements of intent differently than forward-looking statements, and
it seems clear that a statement of intent would fall within the
definitions of forward-looking statement provided in Rule 175 and the
Reform Act.3
While the definition of a forward-looking statement in Rule 175 and
in the Reform Act is broad, some types of soft information exist that
would not be included.
Possibly the largest category of soft
information potentially outside the statutory definition of forwardlooking statement are opinions. A good example is the statements
made in A.H. Robins. 31 In A.H. Robins, the company stated that its
birth control device was safe and effective, which later proved to be
untrue. 2 A.H. Robins has sometimes been cited as a duty to correct
case, while other times it has been described as supporting a duty to
update. How a court currently would evaluate the statements claimed
to have been made by Robins is not clear. The statements cannot
easily be categorized as a historical statement of fact. The statements
are not descriptions of prior events, nor are they statements of fact
such as sales volume, the veracity of which can readily be tested. On
the other hand, the statements do not clearly make a projection as to
the future as does an estimate of future sales. The statements are
really opinions based upon known information, and later known
information may or may not force a change of that opinion. Such
opinions, however, share important similarities with forward-looking
statements. The passage of time or the change of circumstances may
not allow the opinion to be repeated without being misleading. It
appears that what Robins meant to say was: "based upon all available
scientific evidence, we currently believe the device is safe and
effective and we expect that the device will ultimately be proven to be
safe and effective." Had Robins rephrased its statements in this way
they would have clearly been forward-looking statements. Statements
that have the same qualities as forward-looking statements, at least
with respect to a duty to update, should be treated as other forwardlooking statements, whether or not they fall within the definition of a
forward-looking statement in Rule 175 or the Reform Act. 33
229. The Third Circuit later noted that Rule 13d-2 was the source of the duty to
update in In re Phillips. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1433-34 (3d Cir. 1997).
230. The Reform Act definition of forward-looking statement includes "a
statement of the plans and objectives of management for future operations." 15
U.S.C. § 77z-2(i)(1)(B).
231. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

232. See id. at 906.
233. Under current case law, it may not matter whether the statements made in

A.H. Robins were factual or forward-looking. If the statements were factual, they

may be viewed to have been incorrect when made, thus triggering a duty to correct. If
the statements were forward-looking, they "became" misleading, thus triggering a
duty to update.
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3. Normative Concerns
Examining whether normative concerns justify the creation of a
duty to update requires revisiting the general rule, which states that
there is no duty to disclose all material information, and that there can
be no liability for non-disclosure absent a duty to speak.-'
As
described earlier, a duty to update cannot be applied to historical
factual statements without repealing the general rule. - -5 Thus, if the
general rule is accepted, a duty to update, if it does exist, can only
apply to forward-looking statements. '-' The question then is whether
there is a normative reason to justify creating an exception to the
general rule that would require updating forward-looking statements.
Several reasons have been identified for treating forvard-looking
statements differently from historical factual statements.- First, it is
argued that the investment community reasonably expects that when a
corporation makes projections, the corporation will assume the
burden of updating the projections if circumstances change. For the
investment community's expectations to be reasonable, however, they
must be based upon the current regulatory structure-existing law and
the federal court's interpretation of the law'
The Burlington Coat
Factory239 court described the regulatory structure as including: (1) the
general rule that companies are not required to disclose all material
information; (2) the well-settled principal that accurate reports of past
success do not imply future success; and (3) the general desire on the
part of the Commission to encourage forward-looking statements.2 '
Given the current regulatory structure and the inconsistencies in
recent federal court decisions, identifying any reasonable expectations
regarding a duty to update is difficult. With all the efforts to narrow
or avoid the application of the duty to update, possibly the only
forward-looking statement that the investment community could
reasonably expect corporations to update is one worded as a
guarantee and related to an action that could cause a fundamental
234. See supra Part I.
235. See supra Part II.B.
236. See Oesterle, supra note 7, at 149-51; Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 316.
237. See Oesterle, supra note 7, at 150. Professor Oesterle stated that the duty to
update has been limited to forward-looking statements. See id. at 149. He suggested
several reasons why the courts have so limited the duty. See id. at 149-52. Instead of
asking why courts have limited the duty to update to forward-looking statements, a
more appropriate inquiry is to determine why courts have treated forward-looking

statements differently from historical factual statements, or why the courts have
created an exception to the general rule for forward-looking statements, when they

have generally refused to create an exception for historical factual statements.
238. See id. at 150 & nn.68-69. Professor Oesterle refers to the court's role as "selfenforcing." Id at 150 n.68. To the extent that federal courts define or reject the duty
to update, investors' reasonable expectations would, over time, conform to the rule.
239. 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997).
240. See id at 1432.
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change to the company, provided that the company both explicitly
stated that it would update the statement and identified how long it
intended to provide updates. 4 '
A second reason promulgated for treating forward-looking
statements differently from historical factual statements rests upon
the hypothesis that companies have vastly superior information about
the company. Because corporations allegedly possess an information
advantage, investors take projections very seriously, the projections
provide a tempting vehicle for fraud. 42 The serious regard of
investors for projections might justify careful scrutiny of projections in
general. No apparent connection exists, however, between preventing
fraud and imposing a duty to update forward-looking statements.
Whether the failure to update a forward-looking statement would
provide any more opportunity for fraud than the failure to disclose
any other material information is unclear. And, the failure to update
a forward-looking statement does not lead to fraud unless the
investment community would expect the company to update forwardlooking statements, the company is aware of the expectation, and the
company intentionally withholds updates to its advantage.
In
addition, where a company intends to take advantage of its failure to
update a forward-looking statement, a remedy would generally be
available for such fraud without the need to create a duty to update.243
Third, the different treatment of forward-looking statements has
been justified by suggesting that forward-looking statements contain
an implicit representation by the maker that the statements will be
updated if circumstances change.
The implicit representation
argument appears to have its genesis in the often-quoted dicta in
Polaroid: "We may agree that, in special circumstances, a statement,
correct at the time, may have a forward intent and connotation upon
which parties may be expected to rely. If this is a clear meaning, and
there is a change, correction, more exactly, further disclosure, may be
called for. ' '24 The court's statement in Polaroidhas somehow evolved
from a limitation on when a duty to update might arise-only when
241. This is the type of statement that might pass muster under the combined
approaches by the courts in In re Burlington Coat Factory, Hillson, IBM, and
Polaroid. Of course, no such forward-looking statements are ever made.
242. See Oesterle, supra note 7, at 151; see also Brill, supra note 39, at 672 (noting
that because "the duty to update does provide the public with some protection against
fraud, courts may continue to recognize the duty ."). Brill does not, however, discuss
how the duty to update provides such protection.
243. For example, assume that a company makes a forward-looking statement and
fails to update it when circumstances change. The company then sells shares of its
stock in the market. In that case, the company is trading in its securities while in
possession of undisclosed material information. The company would be liable for
securities fraud under a theory of insider trading. Alternatively, any registration
statement prepared in connection with the sale of the stock would be materially
deficient and would subject the company to liability.
244. Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).

2000]

PUBLIC COMPANY DISCLOSURE

2241

there is a clear statement that a company intends to update a forward-

looking statement, 245 to a justification for imposing the duty-the duty
is justified because it is implicit in forward-looking statements that a
company will update them.2' Absent an express statement of an
intention to update, nothing inherent in forward-looking statements
implies such an intent to update. -47
Two additional arguments have been put forward in favor of a duty
to update.

First, the fiduciary duty a corporation owes to its

stockholders should give rise to a duty to update.2" Second, a policy
argument suggests that a duty to update is warranted to insure that
markets receive all necessary information to prevent distortion of
prices, 49 or is warranted because the duty to update supports the full
disclosure goal of securities laws. " The problem with both of these
arguments is that each equally supports a duty to update historical
factual statements. Without some additional basis to explain why
forward-looking statements should be subject to a duty to update but

historical factual statements should not, these arguments alone are not
sufficient to justify imposing a duty to update forward-looking

statements.
The inability to distinguish why a duty to update should be imposed

on forward-looking statements but not on historical factual statements
is highlighted by the anomalous outcome of the following example.
Assume that two companies, Alpha Company and Beta Company,
each make the following statements on January 1:
Alpha Company: We are not involved in any negotiations regarding
a material acquisition.
Beta Company: We do not plan to make any material acquisitions

this year.
The statement by Alpha Company is a factual statement.

The

245. See Carl W. Schneider, The Uncertain Duty to Update-PolaroidH1 Brings a
Welcome Limitation, 4 Insights 2, 10 (1990) (arguing that Polaroid may require an
intent to induce or exploit an investor's expectation that a company ill update a
statement if circumstances change).
246. See Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 317 ("A forward-looking statement may
become misleading as a result of subsequent events because such a statement, by its
terms, purports to remain valid beyond the date it was made.").
247. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1432-33 (3d Cir.
1997) ("[Tlhe market knows that companies have neither a specific obligation to
disclose internal forecast nor a general obligation to disclose all material
information ....
[Florecasts contain no more than the implicit representation that
the forecasts were made reasonably and in good faith." (citations omitted)); Bruce A.
Hiler, The SEC and the Courts' Approaci to Disclosure of EarningsProjections,Asset
Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 Md. L
Rev. 1114, 1116, 1126 (1987) ("[O]nly truly factual elements involved in a projection
are the implicit representations that the statements are made in good faith and with a
reasonable basis.").
248. See Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 294-97.
249. See id. at 315.
250. See Brill, supra note 39, at 615.
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statement by Beta Company has a forward-looking component. Now
assume that on February 1, both Alpha Company and Beta Company
each enter into negotiations regarding a material acquisition. Since
the statement made by Alpha Company is not a forward-looking
statement, as long as the statement was correct when first made,
Alpha Company would have no duty to provide any additional
information regarding its acquisition plans. Conversely, because the
statement made by Beta Company has a forward-looking component,
Beta Company would now be required to update its earlier statement
if a duty to update exists. At a minimum, Beta Company would have
to disclose that its expectations regarding material acquisitions over
the coming year had changed. It may also be required to disclose
additional details about its acquisition plans to ensure that its
statement informing the public that its acquisition plans had changed
would not be misleading. Beta Company would have to make such
disclosures despite the fact that no acquisition has been consummated
and despite the significant possibility that no acquisition will result
from the current negotiations.
Following February 1, if either Alpha Company or Beta Company
repeated the statement they made on January 1, such a statement
would be misleading and could subject either company to liability.
Following February 1, the stockholders of each company are in the
same position. Each company is involved in ongoing negotiations
regarding a material acquisition, and the stockholders of each
company would presumably have the same amount of interest in
knowing about such negotiations. No justification exists for holding
Beta Company liable for not disclosing unquestionably material
information when Alpha Company would not incur liability for
withholding the same information.
4.

The Commission's Stance on the Duty to Update

Assertions that the Commission supports the duty to update have
provided support for the judicial recognition of the duty.2 I At least at
one point, the Commission clearly believed that companies had a duty
to update forward-looking statements.z2 The Commission's views
251. See Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 312 ("Commission pronouncements
concerning an issuer's duty to correct and to update its misleading statements
generally support the imposition of those duties on issuers.").
252. See Safe Harbor Rules for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084 [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117, at 81,938 (June 25, 1979). The
Release stated:
[T]he Commission reminded issuers of their responsibility to make full and
prompt disclosure of material facts, both favorable and unfavorable, where
management knows or has reason to know that its earlier statements no
longer have a reasonable basis. With respect to forward-looking statements
of material facts made in relation to specific transactions or events (such as
proxy solicitations, tender offers, and purchases and sales of securities),
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concerning forward-looking statements in general, however, have

changed dramatically over the last thirty years.-' Until the early
1970's, the Commission prohibited the disclosure of forward-looking
statements. 25 It felt that such information was "inherently unreliable"
and that "unsophisticated investors would place undue emphasis on
the information."' In response to severe criticism,2 the Commission
began to change its views."'
By the mid-1970's, the Commission had come to regard the
disclosure of forward-looking information as critical to the

there is an obligation to correct such statements prior to consummation of
the transaction where they become false or misleading by reason of
subsequent events which render material assumptions underlying such
statements invalid. Similarly, there is a duty to correct where it is discovered
prior to consummation of a transaction, that the underlying assumptions
were false or misleading from the outset.
Moreover, the Commission believes that, depending on the circumstances.
there is a duty to correct statements made in any filing, whether or not the
filing is related to a specified transaction or event, if the statements either
have become inaccurate by virtue of subsequent events, or are later
discovered to have been false and misleading from the outset, and the issuer
knows or should know that persons are continuing to rely on all or any
material portion of the statements.
Id at 81,943 (citation omitted).
253. See generally Gwyn & Matton, supra note 39, a 366 (-[The SEC has
significantly expanded the role of forecasts, predictions, and projections in the last
twenty-five years...."); Hiler, supra note 247, at 1116 (-[T]he SEC's policy on
disclosure of soft information has undergone significant revision over the last ten
years."); Janet E. Kerr, A Walk Through the Circuits: The Duty to Disclose Soft
Information, 46 Md. L. Rev. 1071, 1072 (1987) ("[Tihe SEC policy on [soft
information disclosure] can only be described as one in rapid transition."); Joel
Seligman, The SEC's Unfinished Soft Information Revolution, 63 Fordham L Rev.
1953, 1953 (1995) ("[T]he SEC has shifted its emphasis from historical information to
its current emphasis on forward-looking information.").
254. See Statement by the Commission on Disclosure of Projections of Future
Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5362, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,211, at 82,665 (Feb. 2, 1973).
255. Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act Release No.
7101, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 7 85,436, at 85,778-79
(Oct. 13, 1994); see also Disclosure to Investors: A Reappraisal of Federal
Administrative Policies Under the '33 and '34 Acts: The Wheat Report (1969) at 94
("[L]engthy items in the forms calling for disclosure concerning all relevant types of
misconduct or financial difficulties would not only complicate the forms but might be
offensive."). For a fuller discussion of the reasons for the Commission's historical
bias against soft information and forward-looking statements, see Seligman, supra
note 253, at 1955.
256. See, e.g., Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some
Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1151, 1198 (1970) (characterizing the Commission's views
as "nonsense").
257. See Statement by the Commission on Disclosure of Projections of Future
Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5362, 11972-1973 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,211, at 82,665 (Feb. 2, 1973). The Commission
announced that it intended to promulgate rules to permit voluntary disclosure of
projections and to create a safe-harbor to protect such statements. See id.
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marketplace2 8 The Commission began to recognize that most
investment decisions were based upon estimates of future
performance and that a corporation's management was best qualified
to make such projections.259
In 1979, with the goal of encouraging the disclosure of projections
and other forward-looking information, the Commission adopted
Rule 175 under the Securities Act and Rule 3b-6 under the Exchange
Act.2 1 The new rules provided a safe harbor for forward-looking
statements, but only if the statements were made or reaffirmed in
documents filed with the Commission.26 ' In the release adopting Rule
175 and Rule 3b-6, the Commission expressed its views that a duty to
update forward-looking statements did and should exist.262 The
Commission did not, however, discuss the source of this duty or any
justification for its imposition. More important, the Commission did
not, as part of the new rules, explicitly impose a duty to update
forward-looking statements.
The safe harbor for forward-looking statements generated a
substantial amount of criticism. 263 In general, critics complained that

the safe-harbor was too narrow to provide sufficient comfort to
corporations to induce them to issue forward-looking statements.2"
In 1994, the Commission published a concept release soliciting
comments regarding the safe-harbor.265 The concept release also
contained numerous proposals for new regulatory text submitted by
various commentators, which would have broadened the safeharbor.26
The Commission acknowledged that a significant criticism of the
safe harbor involved confusion over whether a duty to update
258. See House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities
and Exchange Commission 350 (Comm. Print 1977) (Advisory Committee Report);
Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 82,117 at 81,939 (June 25, 1979).
259. See Kripke, supra note 256, at 1199.
If there is any hope that the public or even the professionals can make an
informed investment judgment, it must start from a crystallization of all of
the plethora of information into a project for the future. The management is
in the best position to make the initial estimate; on the basis of it the
professional or investor could then make his own modifications. No other
single change could add as much meaning to the unmanageable and
unfocussed flood of facts in present Commission documents.
See id.
260. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175, 240.3b-6 (1999).
261. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(b)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(b)(1).
262. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
263. See Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act Release No.
7101, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9! 85,436, at 85,778, 85,786
(Oct. 13, 1994) (citations omitted).
264. See id.
265. See id. at 85,778.
266. See id. at 85,782.
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forward-looking statements existed, and if it did, the circumstances
under which it would be applied. 267 The Commission specifically
sought comment as to whether a duty to update should exist, and
whether the safe harbor for forward-looking statements should
specifically eliminate any duty to update.2 One of the proposals
included in the concept release, submitted by the Business
Roundtable and the National Association of Manufacturers,
eliminated any duty to update unless a corporation specifically and
contemporaneously undertook to update the statement. 2 9
Shortly after the publication of the concept release, Congress
passed the Reform Act,27 which contained a number of the proposals
discussed in the release. Whether because of passage of the Reform
Act or because of internal dissension regarding broadening the safe
harbor, the Commission has not taken any further action. At a
minimum, however, it seems clear that the Commission considered
eliminating the duty to update. Given the statements in the 1994
concept release, the Commission's support of the duty to update can
no longer be assumed.
5. Traditional Doctrine
The principal argument favoring the creation of a duty to update is
one that is sometimes unstated, but appears to be implicit both in
federal court decisions stating that a duty to update exists and in the
arguments of commentators supporting the duty. The argument is
that a forward-looking statement, even if not misleading when made,
becomes misleading or inaccurate over time when circumstances
change.271 The argument seems to draw support from the rejection of
a duty to update historical statements. A duty to update historical
statements was rejected as illogical, because historical statements by
definition speak only to a specific point in time, and nothing in the
nature of a historical statement suggests a promise that circumstances
will not change.2 2 Thus, no duty to update historical statements can
267. See id. at 85,792.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 85,794.
270. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)-(d) (Supp. IV 1998).
271. See Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310,316 (3d Cir. 1997); Rubinstein v.
Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 170 n.41 (5th Cir. 1994) ("We note that, at least facially, it
appears that defendants have a duty under Rule lOb-5 to correct statements if those
statements have become materially misleading in light of subsequent events."
(emphasis added)); Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990);
Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1984), Gv.'yn & Matton, supra
note 39, at 377 (describing a duty to update as a duty to "update statements that are
"correct when made, but which become materially misleading due to subsequent
events"); Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 289.
272. See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995)
("By definition an historical statement is addressing only matters at the time of the
statement. Thus, that circumstances subsequently change cannot render an historical
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exist because historical statements cannot become misleading. Those
supporting a duty to update forward-looking statements seem to argue
that because a forward-looking statement speaks to the future, and
not to a definite point in the past, a forward-looking statement can
become misleading over time when circumstances change. This
argument is seriously flawed.

Inherent in the nature of predictions is the reality that many, if not
most, forward-looking statements will prove to be poor predictions,
and the events foretold will not come to pass.27 3 As time passes
following the making of a forward-looking statement, and as events
unfold, new information will be gained. As new information is gained,
a different prediction will often be more reasonable. Obviously, if the
maker of the original forward-looking statement were to repeat the
statement in light of this new information, the repeated forwardlooking statement would be misleading, as the maker would no longer
have a reasonable basis for making the forward-looking statement.
This fact alone, however, is insufficient to render the original forwardlooking statement misleading or inaccurate. Unless a forward-looking
statement is repeated or deemed to be repeated, a forward-looking

statement that was not misleading when made does not become
misleading simply because new information exists suggesting that the
prediction may not come true.274 Nothing inherent in the nature of a
forward-looking statement suggests that it should be interpreted as
continually repeated over time.275 A forward-looking statement is no

statement false or misleading."); Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 317 ("The limitation
discussed earlier on an issuer's duty to update-that such a duty attaches only to
forward-looking statements-definition, arises only if a statement has become
materially 'misleading' due to subsequent events." (citations omitted)).
273. The Seventh Circuit has stated that "predictions of future performance are
inevitably inaccurate because things almost never go exactly as planned." In re
HealthCare Compare Corp. Sec. Litig., 75 F.3d 276, 281 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Arazie v. Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456, 1468 (7th Cir. 1993)).
274. See Kitch, supra note 210, at 808 n.141. Professor Kitch suggests that an
appropriate defense to a duty to update claim would be to argue that the forecasts
were correct as of the date they were provided and that there was no suggestion that
the forecasts would remain correct and no promise to update the forecasts when they
became "obsolete." See id.
275. There may be at least one situation in which a forward-looking statement
would be deemed to be continually repeated. Companies now commonly place
forward-looking statements on their web site. Moreover, the forward-looking
statements are often not dated. In such cases, it would seem reasonable to deem the
forward-looking statement to be repeated each time it was accessed. Investors
encountering undated forward-looking statements would be entitled to assume that
the statement represented management's current view of the future. Nonetheless,
such a company would not be subject to a duty to update, at least not in the classic
sense. Instead of facing liability for failure to update a previous forward-looking
statement, such a company would instead face potential liability for making a material
misstatement under existing doctrine. For a thorough discussion of the Internet and
related disclosure obligations, see Robert A. Prentice, The Future of Corporate
Disclosure: The Internet, Securities Fraud,and Rule 10b-5, 47 Emory L.J. 1 (1998).
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different from a historical statement in that both are made as of a
particular point in time. Although obviously different in temporal
orientation, a forward-looking statement simply predicts the future
based on the information that exists at the time the statement is made.
Assume, for example, that HighTech Company earned one dollar
per share for the first fiscal quarter of 1999. The statement is either
true or false. If true, it is always true, and the statement, if repeated
six months or six years later, is still true when repeated. On the other
hand, assume that HighTech Company makes the statement that it
expects to earn one dollar per share in the 1999 fiscal year. When
made the statement is neither true or false. It is simply a prediction,
and it may be a good or bad prediction.276 Once the fiscal year ends,
the accuracy of the prediction will be known. Prior to the end of the
fiscal year, however, and prior to conclusively knowing the fiscal
year's results, it is likely that one month, or even one week or one day
following the original prediction, HighTech Company will have
further information about it sales, future orders, and expenses for the
current fiscal year, which will likely affect its predictions of earnings
for the fiscal year. HighTech Company now likely has a new earnings
prediction. The fact that HighTech Company might at a later date
make a different prediction does not mean that the original prediction
is false, or even misleading. It was just a bad prediction, as are most
predictions.
The argument in favor of a duty to update has a circular nature. A
duty to update is necessary because without such a duty a forwardlooking statement becomes misleading when circumstances change.
But such a forward looking statement misleads only if one is entitled
to rely on it. And one is only entitled to rely on it if there is a duty to
update it.
Even if a forward-looking statement becomes misleading over time,
the literal language of Rule 10b-5(b) does not permit the examination
of events that occur after a statement is made to determine whether
the statement is misleading. Rule 10b-5(b) makes it unlawful to omit
a material fact necessary to make statements that are made not
misleading "in light of the circumstances under which they were
made," implying that the determination of whether a statement is
misleading must be made at the time it is made. The Seventh Circuit
in Stransky has espoused this view,' as have several commentators. -"

276. It could also be misleading when made, if the prediction was not honestly
believed when made or if there was no reasonable basis for making the prediction.
277. See Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1332 ("The rule implicitly precludes basing liability on
circumstances that arise after the speaker makes the statement.").
278. See Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 307; Carl W. Schneider, Duty to Update: Does
a Snapshot DisclosureRequire the Commencement of a Motion Picture?,3 Insights 3.
6 (Feb. 1989) (imposing a duty to update "requires a very strained reading of Rule
lOb-5").
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It is axiomatic that in order for there to be liability under Rule lOb5(b), there must first be a misleading statement or omission.279 Thus,
there can be no liability under Rule 10b-5(b) for failure to update a
forward-looking

statement,

statement. 280
6.

because

there

is

no

misleading

Effect of the Reform Act

Numerous commentators and even the Seventh Circuit have
questioned whether a duty to update, if it did in fact exist, survived the
enactment of the Reform Act. 1 One of the Reform Act's primary
purposes was to encourage the publication of forward-looking
statements.m Congress perceived that a fear of litigation based upon
unrealized projections restricted corporate management. 83 The
Reform Act, among other things, creates a statutory safe-harbor for

279. Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (applying the terms
"manipulative" and "deceptive" in section 10b of the Exchange Act conditioned upon
there being a misstatement or omission of a material fact; an allegation of unfair
conduct is insufficient).
280. It is possible that the failure to update a forward-looking statement could be
considered a "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" under Rule 10b-5(a) or an "act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person" under Rule 10b-5(c). See Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 307 (citing 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (1990)). This would, however, only shift the analysis from a
question of whether there was a misleading statement to one of whether failing to
update a forward-looking statement is fraudulent.
Rosenblum argues that a
company's knowing failure to update can be considered fraud because the company's
shareholders may be deceived into paying too much for its securities. See id. at 306-07.
This only begs the questions of how a previously made forward-looking statement
that was not misleading when made can be deceptive, and how the failure to update a
forward-looking statement can be fraudulent when the failure to disclose other
material information is not fraud.
281. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see Eisenstadt v. Centel
Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[I]t is true... that in this circuit, and maybe
now in all circuits (as a result of the recent amendments to the securities laws), there
is no duty to correct a prediction falsified by subsequent events.... ."); Walter Rieman
et al., The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A User's Guide, 24 Sec.
Reg. L.J. 143, 158 (1996) (arguing that the Reform Act does not eliminate a duty to
update); Richard A. Rosen, The Statutory Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking
Statements After Two and a Half Years: Has it Changed the Law? Has it Achieved
What Congress Intended?, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 645, 667 (1998) ("Although some have
suggested that the intent of the provision is to eliminate any duty to update, the more
plausible reading is that the Act does not impose any obligation to update that does
not already exist."); Carl W. Schneider & Jay A. Dubow, Forward-Looking
Information-Navigatingthe Safe Harbor,51 Bus. Law. 1071, 1077 (1996).
282. See Rosen, supra note 281, at 646 ("The single greatest impetus to passage of
the Reform Act was the perception-amply supported by the evidence-that issuers
had been deterred from making projections and from disseminating soft information
because of a fear of liability if their public statements failed accurately to predict the
future.").
283. See 141 Cong. Rec. H13,703 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995).
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forward-looking statements.' Under the Reform Act, a forwardlooking statement cannot be the basis for liability if either the plaintiff
fails to prove that the forward-looking statement was made with
actual knowledge that it was inaccurate, or if the forward-looking
statement is identified as such and is accompanied by cautionary
statements indicating factors that may affect the outcome of the
events predicted by the forward-looking statement.
The debate over the effect of the Reform Act has centered on a
curious provision, which states that "[n]othing in this section shall
impose upon any person a duty to update a forward-looking
statement."'
Some commentators have argued that this language
suggests Congressional intent to eliminate the duty to update, and that
the language has no meaning otherwise, because safe-harbors by
definition do not impose or create any additional duties.'
A few
district courts have agreed. "-sT Others have argued that such language
has no effect on the duty to update. Congress could have easily
eliminated the duty to update if elimination was its intent.2 Read
literally, the Reform Act only says that the Reform Act shall not
create a duty to update. The Act does not indicate an intention to
eliminate any duty to update that may have existed independently
from the Reform Act. As such, the better argument is that this
section of the Reform Act does not have any impact on the duty to
update. The analysis, however, is not over.
First, the courts and commentators who have supported a duty to
update have described the duty as arising when a forward-looking
statement "become[s] materially misleading" as a result of changed
circumstances.1 9 In essence, such courts and commentators are using
284. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).

285. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(d).

286. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform
Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. Law. 975, 992 (1996) (stating
that Congress's "statement borders on the tautological"); Julia B. Strickland & Mary
D. Manesis, Litigatinga Safe Harbor. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine,at 157 (PLI/Corp Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 147, 1996) ("This provision may make the statutory safe harbor
particularly attractive to defendants in Circuits which have recognized a duty to
update forward-looking statements."); Wander, supra note 14, at 330 ("[Tihe Reform
Act implies that the duty to update no longer exists.").
287. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 536-37 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing
the Reform Act, the court stated that the defendant was under no duty to update);
Karacand v. Edwards, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1245, 1253 (D. Utah 1999) (same).
28& See Brill, supra note 39, at 651 ("However, one can make an equally strong
argument that the safe harbor does not reject the judge-created duty to update.");
Cochran & McCoy, supra note 278, at 17; John C. Coffee, Jr., Safe Harborfor
Forward-Looking Statements, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 30, 1995, at 5 ("[The Reform Act]
would seem to leave that duty unchanged and intact. Had Congress wanted to say
that the maker of a forward-looking statement is under no duty to update,
notwithstanding any contrary interpretation, it could have easily so provided.
Instead, it appears to have compromised ambiguously.").
289. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
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the forward-looking statement as the basis for liability. The explicit
language of the Reform Act, however, does not allow this. In
providing a safe harbor for forward-looking statements, the Reform
Act provides that if a forward-looking statement meets the
requirements of the safe harbor, no person shall be liable with respect
to any forward-looking statement in any "private action... that is
based on an untrue statement of a material fact or omission of a
material fact necessary to make the statement not misleading."""0
Second, in creating the safe harbor, Congress has in essence
codified the bespeaks caution doctrine. 291 The bespeaks caution
doctrine holds that contemporaneous cautionary statements can
counteract the effect of a forward-looking statement in the overall mix
of information, and can render a forward-looking statement
immaterial as a matter of law. 29 Although the Reform Act does not
explicitly state that forward-looking statements are rendered
immaterial by accompanying cautionary statements, the similarity
between the safe harbor and the bespeaks caution doctrine suggests
that Congress intended this effect. If the forward-looking statement is
immaterial as a matter of law, logically, no duty to update the
statement exists.293
Of course, even if the Reform Act were interpreted as eliminating
the duty to update, it would only apply to those forward-looking
statements that fit the statutory definition. Soft information and
opinions that do not fit the Reform Act definition of a forwardlooking statement would be unaffected by the Reform Act. In
addition, even if a statement satisfied the Reform Act's definition of a
forward-looking statement, if it did not qualify for the safe harbor's
protection, it could still be subject to a duty to update if one exists.
Although the Reform Act would not literally eliminate a duty to
update those forward-looking statements that do not fall within the
provision of the Reform Act, eliminating the duty to update entirely
would seem consistent with the goals of the Reform Act. In addition
to encouraging the publication of forward-looking statements, the
Reform Act represents an attempt to replace the post hoc inquiry into
"what a company knew and when it knew it" that is inherent in
determining whether a forward-looking statement was misleading
when made (i.e., was the forward-looking statement honestly believed
290. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1).
291. See In re Home Health Corp. of America, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 98-834, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1230, at 6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1999) (referring to the Reform Act as
the corollary of the judicially created bespeaks caution doctrine); Karacand v.
Edwards, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1243 ("In enacting the Reform Act, Congress created a
statutory version of the bespeaks caution doctrine."); see also Rosen, supra note 281,
at 662 (observing that the Reform Act "codified" the bespeaks caution doctrine).
292. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
293. See Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 219 (4th Cir.
1994).
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and was there a reasonable basis for making the forward-looking
statement), with a more objective test: were there also cautionary
statements made contemporaneously with the forward-looking
statement. 294 Eliminating a duty to update would further the goal of
encouraging the publication of forward-looking statements and it
would eliminate the need for any post hoc analysis.
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO ANALYZING FORWARD-LOOKING
STATEMENTS

For a variety of reasons, a large number of companies that make
forward-looking statements choose to update them. Certainly, many
companies have been advised by their counsel that while there is
uncertainty about the duty to update, they should update lest they
find themselves sued in a jurisdiction that recognizes the duty to
update. Other companies probably update their forward-looking
statements because they believe that it is good business, recognizing
that the market places a value on timely information, and may reward
companies that voluntarily provide useful market information.
Two situations exist in which companies should be required to
provide additional information regarding their prior forward-looking
statements, not because the prior statements have become misleading,
but to prevent their current statements from being misleading. First,
as previously described, companies are required to disclose a
substantial amount of information, both periodically and
episodically. 295 In addition, many companies voluntarily provide
additional information to the public and to securities analysts. When
companies are required to speak or do so voluntarily, they must speak
truthfully. Companies must also comply with what is known as the
"half truth" rule,296 which requires that they also disclose any
additional information necessary to prevent their statements, while
literally true, from being misleading "in light of the circumstances
under which they were made." 21
The language, "in fight of the circumstances under which they were

294. See Rosen, supra note 281, at 646 ("Congress crafted a new rule that, it was
thought, would enable judges to dismiss cases without inquiring into the state of mind
of the defendants or the reasonableness of the assumptions underlying the forwardlooking statement itself.").
295. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
296. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1098 (1991) (holding
that literally accurate statements can be actionable if they are no more than halftruths); see also Oesterle, supra note 7, at 143 (labeling the doctrine relating to
corporate culpability for providing misleading but technically accurate information
the "half-truth" rule).
297. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1999); see 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1994) (covering any
statement made in connection with the offer or sale of a security); 17 C.F.R. § 230.408
(same); id § 240.10b-5(b) (covering all other statements).

2252

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

made, ' 298 should be read to include a company's prior forwardlooking statements. This would require a company to consider its
prior forward-looking statements when it has an obligation to speak
or does so voluntarily. If circumstances have changed since the
forward-looking statements were made, additional disclosure may be
required to prevent the current statements from being misleading.
For example, assume that a company in the first quarter of its fiscal
year makes a predictive statement about its earnings for the full year.
When that company makes its next quarterly 10-Q filing or next
discusses its expected earnings in a press release or with securities
analysts, such a filing or statement should be viewed in light of the
company's prior predictive statement. To the extent that the company
has new information that casts doubt on the prior predictive
statement, the company should be required to include such
information to ensure its 10-Q, press release, or analyst statement is
not misleading.
Item 10(b) of Regulation S-K299 supports the interpretation that a
company in possession of new information regarding prior predictive
statements should be required to disclose the additional information if
required to speak or does so voluntarily. Regulation S-K contains the
specific requirement of the disclosures required to be included in the
episodic reports. Item 10(b) describes the Commission's policy on
projections, and states that the Commission encourages the use of
projections in documents filed with the Commission. Item 10(b) also
contains guidelines to be considered in formulating and disclosing
projections. Specifically, Item 10(b) states:
With respect to previously issued projections, registrants are
reminded of their responsibility to make full and prompt disclosure
of material facts, both favorable and unfavorable, regarding their
financial condition. This responsibility may extend to situations
where management knows or has reason to know that its
previously
3
disclosed projections no longer have a reasonable basis. 00
At first blush, this statement might suggest a continual duty to
update prior projections. Regulation S-K, however, applies only to
registration statements filed under the Securities Act and periodic and
episodic reports filed under the Exchange Act.30 1 As such, Item 10(b)
suggests a duty of companies to review, and possibly to provide
additional disclosure, relative to their prior predictive statements, to
prevent their registration statements and period and episodic reports
from being misleading.
Second, Item 303 of Regulation S-K31 may provide the functional
298. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20.
299. Id. § 229.10(b).

300. Id. § 229.10(b)(3)(iii).
301. See id. § 229.10(a).
302. Id. § 229.303.
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equivalent of a duty to update forward-looking statements. Item 303
requires the disclosure, in registration statements, and periodic and
episodic reports, of: "known trends or any known demands,
commitments, events or uncertainties that will result in or that are
reasonably likely to result in the [company's] liquidity increasing or
decreasing in any material way;"3 3 "known material trends, favorable
or unfavorable, in the [company's] capital resources;"' and "known
trends or uncertainties that have had or that the [company]
reasonably expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable
impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing
operations." 5
Item 303 has been described as requiring the disclosure of "hard
information about the current or immediate past that might materially
In order
change an investor's perception of the company's future."
for a set of facts to represent a trend, it would have to represent a
departure from what has occurred previously, or from what
management expects to occur, which may be shown by a company's
prior forward-looking statements.
Where a developing trend coincides with the subject of a prior
forward-looking statement, Item 303 may provide the functional
equivalent of a duty to update by requiring a company to disclose the
change in circumstances. For example, assume, as in the previous
example, that early in the year, a company makes a prediction about
its earnings for the full year, and further assume that the earnings
prediction is consistent with the company's historical earnings growth
rate. Now assume that when the company makes its next quarterly
10-Q filing, it has information about its future sales or expenses, such
as the termination of a long-term contract or a contractual increase in
labor costs, suggesting that it is unlikely that it will reach its earnings
forecast for the full year. Under such circumstances, Item 303
requires disclosure of the hard data that suggest the emerging trend.
As a practical matter, companies may choose instead to satisfy their
Item 303 obligations by updating their prior forward-looking
statement.
The Commission has, in at least one instance, taken this position.
In In re Caterpillar,Inc.,3" Caterpillar made statements to securities
analysts that it believed that its 1990 net income would be at least as
303. Id. § 229.303(a)(1).
304. Id. § 229.303(a)(2)(ii).
305. Id. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii). For additional discussion of Item 303, see supra notes
103-05 and accompanying text.
306. Gulati, supra note 14, at 728.
307. In re Caterpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30532 [Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Releases 1991-1995] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) J 73,829, at

63,050 (Mar. 31, 1992). For an extensive discussion of In re Caterpillar,see Kitch,
supra note 210, at 804-16.
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high as the prior year. 8 By the time Caterpillar filed its 10-Q for the
first quarter of 1990, and possibly at the time the Caterpillar filed its
10-K for 1989, the corporation knew there was grave doubt about its
ability to meet its earnings estimate for 1990.309 Nonetheless,
Caterpillar did not revise its previous forecast until June 25, 1990.310 If
the Commission believed that Caterpillar had a duty to update, this
would have been a perfect opportunity to pursue enforcement action.
Instead, the Commission claimed that Caterpillar's periodic reports
were misleading as a result of its failing to comply with the
requirements of Item 303. 311 Caterpillar ultimately settled with the
Commission and agreed to cease and desist from violating the
Exchange Act.312

The distinction between this Article's approach to forward-looking
statements and a duty to update is important. The duty to update
focuses on prior statements, and the effect current developments have
on such prior statements. With a duty to update, a company's prior
statements "become misleading" when circumstances change. On the
other hand, the approach of this Article focuses on current statements
and uses the company's prior statements to place its current
statements in context. Under this Article's approach, a company's
current statement may be misleading if it fails to disclose a change in
circumstances from those that existed at the time of its previous
predictive statements.
The Article's framework is consistent with the goal of requiring full
disclosure of material information without placing an unreasonable
burden on companies. A company would be required to examine its
prior predictive statements only when required to speak or when it
chose to do so voluntarily. Corporations would not be required to
continually monitor all prior predictive statements to determine
whether they still honestly believed their predictions or whether the
statements still had a reasonable basis. In addition, freeing companies
from the burden of continually monitoring their prior predictions
would eliminate much of the disincentive companies face in making
forward-looking statements. This Article's framework encourages
investors to place a proper weight on predictive statements: they are
management's best guess about the future and not a guarantee as to
the ultimate outcome, or a promise that management will provide
308. See In re Caterpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30532 [Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Releases 1991-1995] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 73,829, at
63,051-53 (Mar. 31, 1992).
309. At its April 11, 1990 board of directors meeting, senior management discussed
problems it was having with it Brazilian subsidiary, the likelihood that profits in Brazil
would be substantially lower in 1990 than 1989 and the potential effect that would

have on overall 1990 earnings. See id. at 63,051-52.
310. See id. at 63,052.
311. See id. at 63,055-56.

312. See id. at 63,056.
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minute-by-minute updates as to all developments. Subsequent to the
predictive statement, investors should not assume that circumstances
will not change.
CONCLUSION

Despite more than twenty years of interpretation by the federal
courts, there is still much confusion over the duties to correct and
update. Much of the responsibility for this confusion lies with the
Supreme Court. The Court, in Chiarella,stated: "[wihen an allegation
of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a
'
duty to speak."313
The unfortunate aspect of this statement is that it

has encouraged plaintiffs and the federal courts to look for implied
duties to speak where they have never been found to exist previously.
What the Court should have said is that "absent an explicit duty to
speak under the federal securities laws," there can be no fraud for nondisclosure.
The explicit disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws
are detailed and extensive, and the task public companies face in
complying with the explicit disclosure requirements is daunting. To
the extent that Congress or the Commission believes that the current
comprehensive disclosure system is insufficient, each has ample
authority to fill the gap. The general anti-fraud rules should not be
used to craft implied duties punishing those corporations that comply
with all express disclosure requirements but fail to provide the
potentially limitless amount of information desired by investors.

313. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,235 (1980).
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